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Abstract
In this Article, Thaddeus Pope argues that the Patient Self Determination Act (PSDA) is a failure on its own
terms. The Article first identifiesthe central purpose of the Act as the protection of patient autonomy. The
Article then reviews much of the empirical research on the implementation of the Act. This research suggests
that the medical preferences expressed in advance directives completed pursuant to the PSDA are usually not
based on real understanding because patients are merely "Mirandized" of their right to direct their post-
autonomous medical care. Although some scholars contend that this is the most that can be expected of the
PSDA, Mr. Pope argues that patient autonomy is not an impossible goal.
The Article concludes that patient autonomy can still be protected if advance directives are completed with
adequate informed consent.
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INTRODUCTION
WHEN A PATIENT IS ADMITTED into a federally funded
hospital, even for the simplest of procedures,' she must be given a
copy of the hospital's policy and a statement of the relevant state
law regarding advance directives.2 This is required by the Patient
Self-Determination Act (PSDA) of 1990,3 which not only requires
that hospitals recognize and honor advance directives when they
are made, but also requires that hospitals inform patients of their
right to make them in the first place.
1 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 819 n. 80 (9th Cir.
1996), (en banc) (recognizing that Congress favors allowing adult patients to refuse
life-sustaining treatment by advance directives and even requires hospitals receiving
federal funds to notify adult patients of their right to execute such instruments upon
admission to the hospital), overruled on other grounds sub. nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(2)(A) (1994) (stating that the "[tihe written infor-
mation... shall be provided to an adult individual, in the case of a hospital, at the
time of the individual's admission as an inpatient"). But cf Henry R. Glick et aL,
Advanced Medical Directives in U.S. Hospitals and Nursing Homes: The Implemen-
tation and Impact of the Patient Self- Determination Act, 14 PoL. & LiFE Scl. 47, 52
(1995) (reporting that over one-third of institutions do not provide advance directive
information to psychiatric, incompetent, demented, comatose, or intoxicated indi-
viduals, obstetrical patients, emergency room patients, and those held overnight for
observation).
3 President George Bush signed the PSDA into law on November 5, 1990 as
part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, but the law did not go into
effect until December 1, 1991. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508 § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to -206 (setting
forth the provisions of the Patient Self-Determination Act, codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1990)).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A) (requiring service providers to give indi-
viduals written information concerning state laws on advance directives and the right
to accept or refuse medical treatment, as well as information on the policies of the
service provider regarding implementation of individual rights). The right to refuse
lifesaving treatment was constitutionally guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1990) (holding
that if Nancy Cruzan had left clear and convincing evidence of her health care prefer-
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According to a 1995 General Accounting Office (GAO) re-
port5 and a 1995 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation study,6 U.S.
hospitals have generally complied with the PSDA and do inform
patients of their right to complete an advance directive. U.S. hos-
pitals do not, however, do very much to inform these patients how
to meaningfully and effectively exercise that right. Although pro-
viders comply with the PSDA's formal requirements, they "merely
follow the letter of the law"7 and fail to meet the PSDA's under-
lying purpose of protecting patient autonomy and self-
determination. 8 In short, the PSDA's legal requirements have be-
ences before she became incompetent, then Missouri would have had to respect her
expressed wishes). The PSDA is regulatorily implemented by the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA).
5 Patient Self-Determination Act - Providers Offer Information on Advance
Directives but Effectiveness Uncertain, GAO/HEHS Doc. No.95-135, at 4 (1995)
(reporting on the result, to date, of the effectiveness and implementation of advance
directives under the Patient Self-Determination Act) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
6 Alfred F. Connors, Jr. et al., A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously
Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for
Outcomes and Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995) (confirming
the existence of barriers to optimal end-of-life patient care and demonstrating in-
creased patient-physician communication is inadequate to address the problem); see
also Bernard Lo, End-of-Life Care After Termination of SUPPORT, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec., at S6 (explaining the SUPPORT study findings and ex-
ploring what could be done to improve the process of dying).
7 Glick et al., supra note 2, at 57 (explaining that the PSDA is not as effective
as it could be because it merely requires hospitals and nursing homes'to make pa-
tients aware of advance directives; thus, the PSDA does not provide adequate incen-
tives for the institutions to explain more fully to patients their options; see also John
La Puma et al., Advance Directives on Admission: Clinical Implications and Analysis
of the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 266 JAMA 402, 404 (1991)
("[I]mpos[ing] a minimal standard of behavior... may become the maximum stan-
dard rerformed").
See Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives:
A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 249, 259, 267 (1997) (examining the legislative history of the PSDA); see also
Glick et al., supra note 2, at 52 ("Making patients aware... of advance directives
satisfies the basic requirements of the PSDA, but the effectiveness of the law can be
increased if hospitals ... develop procedures to guarantee that most consumers un-
derstand their options ...").
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come a ceiling instead of a floor.9 Well-intentioned objectives have
been transformed into "paper formalities."' 0
This minimalistic compliance is exemplified in a metaphor
often applied to the PSDA. The PSDA has been described as
health care's own "Miranda warning,"" referring to the Fourth
Amendment reading of rights at arrest. 2 The metaphor is accurate
but unfortunate. Empirical research establishes that most suspects
do not understand the Miranda warnings. 13 Although "Miranda
9 See Susan M. Wolf et al., Sources of Concern about the Patient Self-
Determination Act, 325 NEwENG. J. MED. 1666, 1670 (1991) (warning that the legal
requirements of advance directives may reduce the discussion of treatment options if
they become a ceiling, rather than a floor, for discussion). Indeed, Larson and Eaton
explain that "meaningless formality" was a recognized consequence of making the
bill modest and politically viable. Larson & Eaton, supra note 8, at 265-66.
10 Fiscal Year 1991 Reconciliation Issues Relating to Durable Medical Equip-
ment, Clinical Laboratory Services, and Other Issues Under the Medicare Program:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1990) (statement of Charles P. Sabatino, American Bar
Association) (discussing the danger of making the PSDA ineffective by miring it in
paperwork).
" Senator John C. Danforth of Missouri introduced the bill this way. Senate to
Debate Federal Legislation, Soc'Y FOR RIGHT TO DIE NEWSL. (Society for the Right
to Die, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1990, at 1, 7 (referring to the Patient Self-
Determination Act of 1989 proposed by Senators Danforth and Moynahan). See also
Michael A. Refolo, Comment, The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990: Health
Care's Own Miranda, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 455 (1992) (using the
Miranda reference to characterize the PSDA); Paul Cotton, Providers to Advise of
Medical Miranda, 265 JAMA 306 (1991) (presenting requirements of the Patient
Self-Determination Act and examples of health care provider responses); Doug Po-
dolsky, A Right to Die Reminder: A New Law Requires Hospitals to Read You Your
Medical Rights, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1991, at 74 (explaining that un-
der the PSDA, hospitals are required to provide patients with a written "medical
Miranda" outlining their rights as patients); Leonard Sloane, '91 Law Says Failing
Patients Must be Told of Their Options, N.Y. TIMES., Dec. 8, 1990, at A4 (discussing
federal legislation that requires hospitals and nursing homes to tell patients if their
state law allows them to refuse treatment).
12 "mhe person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed." Miranda v. State of Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that for statements made by a suspect to be
admissible in court, the suspect must have been told of his constitutional rights prior
to the time the statements were made).
'3 See Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law. The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) (discussing the results and procedures of sev-
eral empirical studies); George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A
Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 821 (1996)
(arguing that there is no proof of a Miranda effect on the confession rate and that
Miranda warnings may be a real-world torture in providing fairness and equality to
the process); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Na-
tion's Capitol: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1374
[Vol. 9:139
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provides a convenient presumption that [a] confession was volun-
tary,' 14 "merely reciting the Miranda warnings may be insufficient
to clearly inform a suspect of the right to counsel [or silence] be-
cause recitation of rights does not guarantee that the suspect will
understand them."1 5 Similarly, advance directives completed pur-
suant to the PSDA are presumed to accurately reflect the health
care preferences of the incompetent individuals later bound by
them. However, this presumption, like that associated with
Miranda, is empirically unfounded. In fact, patients do not under-
stand how to exercise their right to control their post-autonomous
health care. By erroneously assuming this understanding, the
PSDA promotes advance directives which, in fact, do not ade-
quately promote self-determination.
Health careProviders regard advance directives in a "narrow,
legalistic way."' This is exemplified by the fact that the current
emphasis in the medical literature is on the rates of advance direc-
tives completed rather than the quality of the advance directives
completed. 7 The result, as the GAO report notes but under-
emphasizes, is that "advance directives may not always be imple-
mented as patients intend,"' 8 wholly undermining the purpose of
the PSDA, of advance directives in general, and of the common
law, and the constitutional right to medical self-determination.
The focus of this Article is "pragmatic" in that it stresses in-
creased attention to the clinical context, to the specific character-
istics of the patients such as diagnosis, prognosis, and values. 19 It
(1968) (discussing the practical implementation of the Miranda decision in Wash-
ington, D.C. by presenting overall ratings of actual studies).
14 Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self Incrimination
Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 472 (1994) (dis-
cussing the implications of Miranda v. Arizona).
15 Charles J. Williams, Connecticut v. Barnett and the Limited Invocation of the
Right to Counsel: A New Limitation on Fifth Amendment Miranda Protections, 73
IOWA L. REy. 743, 769 n.186 (1988) (discussing 1987 Supreme Court analysis of
Miranda v. Arizona).
16 NANCY M. P. KING, MAKING SENSE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 113 (rev. ed.
1996) (explaining the tendency of doctors and administrators to disregard advance
directives if they do not conform precisely to a specific law).
'7 See infra notes 97-100.
IS GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12 (contrasting provider groups' general sup-
port for advance directives with their lack of implementation).
19 See Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The
Rise of a New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 395, 397 (1994) (discussing the
importance of identifying rules concerning the administration of health care and em-
phasizing the importance of visualizing the clinical settings in which those rules will
be enforced); cf. Joseph J. Fins et al., Clinical Pragmatism. A Method of Moral
Problem Solving, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETreCs J. 129 (1997) (presenting a method for
moral problem solving in clinical practice that is inspired by the philosophy of John
1999]
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is important to identify and legislate rules for the use of advance
directives. Yet, it is just as important to pay attention to the em-
pirical effects of following those rules.20 "Merely proclaiming or
even legislating rights does not make them real for those who need
them.' 2 It is no success to allow, advise, and even encourage pa-
tients to execute advance directives, if those directives fail to re-
flect the actual health care preferences of those patients. 2 As long
as patients complete advance directives without a thorough under-
standing of what they are doing, the formal requirements of the
PSDA will fail to protect patient autonomy. 23 Unless the imple-
Dewey); Franklin G. Miller et al., Clinical Pragmatism: John Dewey and Clinical
Ethics, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 27 (1996) (explaining that bioethics is
shifting from principalism to pragmatism, thereby focusing on the needs of individu-
als in clinical settings). See also John Dewey, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 71, 76 (Julius Rosenthal Foundation for General Law
ed., 1987) (1941) (discussing the theoretical nature of law by stating that
"[flundamentally, a program for action to be tested in action is set forth, not some-
thing that can be judged ... on a purely intellectual basis").
20 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 244 (4th ed. 1994) (stating that "[tihe problems are primarily practical"); see
also Miguel A. Sanchez-Gonzalez, Advance Directives Outside the USA: Are They
the Best Solution Everywhere? 18 THEORETICAL MED. 283, 286 (1997) ("It is curious
that this amplification of [advance directives] ... is occurring without sufficient re-
search into the clinical reality"); ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, IF I WERE A RICH MAN, COULD
I BUY A PANCREAS? xvii (1992) ("The ultimate test of claims in bioethics - as is true
in other areas of applied activity, such as agriculture, engineering, or medicine - is
not logical consistency with theory but pragmatic application").
21 Wolf, supra note 19, at 414 (discussing the importance of helping people
understand their rights so that they may learn to take a more active role in the admini-
stration of their health care). Indeed, the Supreme Court's declaration in Union Pa-
cific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), that "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every indi-
vidual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference by others," did little for patients for over seventy years. See Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding that a physician discharges the duty
to disclose when a reasonable effort to convey sufficient information is made, al-
though the patient may not fully grasp the information).
22 See Robert A. Pearlman et al., Advance Care Planning: Eliciting Patient
Preferences for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 26 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELLING 353,
355 (1995) ("[I]nterventions have increased patient completion... [h]owever these
results may not reflect.., serious deliberation .... These 'quality' aspects of ACP
[advance care planning] were not measured"); see also Chris Hackler, Introduction to
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN MEDICINE 6 (Chris Hackler ed. 1989) ("[S]ome feel that the
growing recognition of advance directives has unduly shifted attention away from the
substantive adequacy of treatment decisions, focusing it primarily on the procedural
adequacy of the decisions").
Of course, the PSDA is not the only way to protect patient autonomy. Patient
autonomy could also be protected by either strengthening state advance directive
laws or voluntarily adopting new informed consent standards. This Article focuses on
[Vol. 9:139
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mentation of these formal requirements is guided by actual clinical
experience, by what is actually required for patient understanding,
the danger of placing an undue emphasis on procedure over sub-
stance looms.
2
This Article calls for vastly improved standards of informed
consent in the advance directive context. Only with such standards
will advance directives reflect, with sufficient accuracy, the pref-
erences of those individuals who are bound by them.25 Section I of
this Article is an introduction both to the PSDA and to advance
directives. Section II reviews the empirical literature assessing the
implementation of the PSDA. This evidence compels the conclu-
sion that although the PSDA's current focus on making patients
aware of their legal rights is laudable, without adequate medical
understanding, patients cannot effectively exercise those legal
rights. After placing this evidence into a normative framework, I
argue that patients' lack of understanding is a serious and funda-
mental problem because the PSDA has not successfully helped pa-
tients preserve their autonomy through directing their post-
autonomous medical care.
I propose that the solution to this problem, identified in Sec-
tion III, is informed consent.26 Informed consent, although always
required for clinical interventions, is not now required in the ad-
vance directive context. Nevertheless, it should be and must be
implemented in this context. In Section IV, I argue that "safe-
the PSDA not only because it is one viable option, but also because the PSDA al-
ready purports to protect patients' "self-deternination."
4 See Alexander Morgan Capron & Vicki Michel, Law and Bioethics, 27 Loy.
L. REv. 25, 29 (1993) (explaining that bioethics remains a legal field dominated by
concern for substance, but is being encroached upon by procedure); see also I ALAN
MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE, § 3.10, at 91 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that "[a]mong health
care professionals, there is a tendency to equate the execution of a consent form with
obtaining informed consent").
25 See I MEISEL, supra note 24, §§ 2.1-2.11 (discussing the state of the law per-
taining to the forgoing of life-sustaining treatment); 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.3
at 6-7. I argue that this is intrinsically important. Nevertheless, a concomitant con-
crete benefit of having more reliable advance directives is that physicians and others
would be less willing to ignore them. See Ashwini Sehgal et al., How Strictly Do
Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance Directives Followed?, 267 JAMA 59 (1992)
(discussing generally the need for advance directives to be completed and the benefits
associated with having the physician and patient discuss the limits of the directive
before it is even needed).
26 See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (discussing informed consent in the medical
field); PAUL S. APPELBAUM El" AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987) (describing the idea of informed consent and its evolution
in legal theory); FAY A. RozovsKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
(2d ed. 1990) (offering practical guidance on informed consent issues).
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guards" are necessary to assure that a (future) incompetent self,
bound by the choices of an (earlier) competent self, would have
made substantially the same choices. Indeed, these safeguards
must be so rigorous that they are properly characterized as pater-
nalistic. This paternalism is necessary to assure, as best as possi-
ble, that the advance directive embodies preferences genuine to the
self bound by it.
I. TILE PURPOSE OF THE PATIENT SELF-
DETERMINATION ACT
There are "incommensurable and unbridgeable differences
between what individuals consider good for themselves or in their
best interest." 27 This lack of axiological consensus has led to the
preeminence of autonomy as "the dominant value prescribed by
bioethicists and legal scholars for mediating provider/patient inter-
actions."8 Because there is no one true or correct way to die, indi-
viduals are free to decide their medical futures for themselves. The
right to die is a legally,29 and even a constitutionally, 30 protected
27 CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 257 (arguing that there is a broad consensus as to
what individuals feel is in their best interest). Caplan explains how "autonomy is
firmly rooted at the foundation of the contemporary bioethical canon." Id. at 259.
Id. at 256; see also Hackler, supra note 22, at 4; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 445 (1982) (explaining that today's medi-
cal community places more emphasis on health care as a marketable commodity,
making both physician and patient autonomy a dominant issue in any interaction);
Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerg-
ing Health Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 2 (1995) (suggesting that "a complex
health care system information infrastructure is emerging in the American health care
system" and, consequently, that there will be a need to access high quality informa-
tion for informed decisions to be made); Hans-Martin Sass, Advance Directives, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 41, 42 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 1998) ("[Aldvance
health care planning by the patient or prospective patient, including the execution of
advance directives, must be regarded as indispensable for good clinical practice, as it
alone will provide ... the necessary and vital information to define the salgus ae-
groti, the 'good of the patient").
29 See CHOICE IN DYING, THE RIGHT TO DIE LAW DIGEST (1998) (collecting state
advance directive statutes); see also Bretton J. Horttor, A Survey of Living Will and
Advance Health Care Directives, 74 N.D. L. REv. 233 (1998) (surveying state legis-
lation that establishes advance directives, thereby protecting the legal right to die).
30 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that
"a competent person has a Constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment"). The Constitutional right to die only encompasses pas-
sive euthanasia. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (holding that
there is no due process right to active euthanasia); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997) (holding that there is no equal protection right to active euthanasia). Never-
theless, although not constitutionally protected, active euthanasia is not constitution-
ally prohibited either. Accordingly, the state of Oregon has legally provided for ac-
tive euthanasia with its Death with Dignity Act. See Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Phy-
[Vol. 9:139
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right. Nevertheless, even ten years after the first advance directive
statutes were enacted in the late 1970s,31 few individuals exercised
this right, often simply because they were unaware they had it.
32
This is where the PSDA came in.
The PSDA, which became effective December 1, 1991, re-
quires health care providers to maintain written policies and pro-
cedures that will educate patients and the public as to their right to
execute advance directives and to direct their post-autonomous
medical care (i.e., direct care provided after the point in time at
which they lose the decision-making capacity to do so contempo-
raneously).33 As a federal law, jurisdictional constraints require
that the PSDA apply only to institutions receiving Medicaid 34 and
Medicare35 funds. Nevertheless, this includes most providers.36
sician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274 JAMA 483 (1995) (ana-
lyzing the provisions of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§
127.800-127.897 (1997), permitting active euthanasia).
31 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1998) (cre-
ating the California Natural Death Act in 1976).
2 See Larson & Eaton, supra note 8, at 258 (explaining that few people write
advance directives because most people do not know that option is available to them).
33 See ALAN D. LIEBERSON, ADVANCE MEDICAL DIREcTivEs 539 (1992) (de-
scribing the PSDA and the responses to it).
14 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)(57) - (58) (1994) (regulating grants to states for
medical assistance programs, including requiring the maintenance of written policies
and procedures regarding advance directives); 42 U.S.C. §1396(v) (1994). The lan-
guage in the Medicaid and Medicare provisions is the same. Therefore, for purposes
of illustration, I shall refer to only the Medicare provisions at 42 U.S.C. §1395cc
(1994) (regulating health insurance for the aged and disabled, in particular, agree-
ments with providers of these services).
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(Q) ("Any provider.., shall be eligible for
payments ... if it files with the Secretary an agreement... to comply with the re-
quirementaof subsection (f) of this section.") (relating to maintaining written policies
and rocedures respecting advance directives).
" See Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Dis-
crimination - It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 944 n. 31 (1990)
(stating that more than 6,800 hospitals and 13,700 outpatient facilities are recipients
of federal financial assistance). The force of this legality lies not just in the threat of
suspension of Medicare funds. State law provides remedies for the violation of ad-
vance directives. In Osgood v. Genesys Reg. Med. Cr., No. 94-26731-NH (Genesee
Cty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1996), a Michigan jury recently awarded $16.6 million to a
plaintiff after her husband was provided life support against his will. See Terminal
Patients' Wishes Ignored, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, May 23, 1996, at 9 (discussing
the impact of Osgood on hospital liability for ignoring living wills). But cf Grace
Plaza v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), affd, 623 N.E.2d
513 (N.Y. 1993) (holding husband financially responsible for care provided in con-
travention of wife's advance directive); Maggie J. Randall Robb, Living Wills: The
Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Treatment - A Right Without a Remedy?, 23 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 169 (1997) (arguing that living wills ought to be enforceable by
means of injunctive relief, statutory relief, and damages).
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Although this Article discusses only hospitals' implementation of
the PSDA, the statute also applies to skilled nursing facilities,
3 7
home health agencies,38 hospice programs, 39 and managed care or-
ganizations. 4°
The requirements of the PSDA are relatively simple. Pro-
viders and eligible organizations must provide written materials
to all adult individuals receiving medical care by or through the
provider or organization (hereinafter "hospital") regarding an
individual's rights under state law to make decisions concerning
such medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medi-
cal or surgical treatment, and the right to formulate advance di-
rectives. 4 The hospital must also provide written information
concerning the written policies of the hospital respecting the
implementation of such rights. 42 The hospital shall document
prominently on the individual's medical record whether or not
the individual has executed an advance directive.43 The hospital
cannot, however, condition the provision of care on whether or
not the individual has executed an advance directive. 44 Hospi-
tals must comply with state laws respecting advance direc-
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(2)(B) (1994). Nursing homes generally have better
implementation than hospitals for those residents who are included. However, a dif-
ferent problem in the nursing home context is that many residents are presumed in-
competent and are excluded from advance directive discussions. See Mathy Mezey et
al., Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act in Nursing Homes in New
York City, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 43 (1997) (examining implementation of
PSDA, verbal directives, procedures for determination of residents' decision-making
capacity, and role of ethics committees in nursing homes in New York City).; Eliza-
beth Bradley et al., Assessing Capacity to Participate in Discussions of Advance Di-
rectives in Nursing Homes: Findings from a Study of the Patient Self-Determination
Act, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 79 (1997) (proposing that the implementation of
the PSDA in long-term care must be better understood).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(2)(C) (1994).
9 See id. § 1395cc(f)(2)(D).
40 See id. § 1395cc(f)(2)(E). Id. §§ 13951(a)(1)(A) (defining "providers"),
1395mm(a) (including HMOs in particular).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i). See also id. § 1395cc(f)(3) (defining the
term "advance directive").
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring the provider to provide written
information concerning their written policies for the implementation of such rights).
Cf. CHOICE IN DYING, ADVANCE DIRECTIVE PROTOCOLS AND THE PATIENT SELF-
DETERMINATION ACT: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTI-
TUTIONAL PROTOCOLS (1991) (providing guidelines for facilities in the development
of their own protocols by summarizing the PSDA, its goals and requirements, and
listing components, specific characteristics, and functions of an advanced protocol).
43 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(l)(B) (1994) (requiring a provider to document in the
individual's medical record whether the individual has an advance directive).
44 Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(C) (prohibiting providers from discriminating against an
individual based on whether the individual executed an advance directive).
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tives.45 Nevertheless, a hospital with conscience objections can
alert the patient in its policy statements and need not follow ad-
vance directives in conflict with its policy.46 Finally, hospitals
must provide for the education of staff and community on issues
concerning advance directives. 47 The whole thrust of the Act is
to alert and educate patients and the public about advance di-
rectives. But what exactly is an advance directive?
A. Advance Directives
Advance directives are written instructions such as a living
will or a durable power of attorney for health care, recognized un-
der state law, 4 relating to the provision of health care when an in-
dividual's condition makes him or her unable to express his or her
wishes. 49 Essentially, either legal form (living will or durable
power of attorney for health care) allows individuals to establish
binding "directives" relating to their care on health care providers
in "advance" of being in a condition in which they might be unable
to make or to communicate such directives. 50 The basic underlying
and motivating idea is that "[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
45 Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(D).
46 Id. § 1395cc(f)(1).
47 Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(E). Cf CHOICE IN DYING, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND COM-
MUNITY EDUCATION: A MANUAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL CAREGIVERS (1991) (providing
guidance for creating community education programs about advance directives).
48 In 1992, Pennsylvania was the fiftieth state to enact advance directive legisla-
tion. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5401-16 (West 1998).
49 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 1, 3-4 (explaining and defining advance
directives). For a comprehensive analysis of the meaning, legal status, and imple-
mentation of advance directives, see 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.1-13.38 and
LIEBERSON, supra note 33.
so "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders (DNRs) are technically, but not legally, a type
of advance directive. See COMMITTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INST. OF MED.,
APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 198-99 (1997) (noting
that, although a DNR is technically a physician's order, because the order is placed in
the patient's chart only after a doctor-patient consultation and discussion regarding
the patient's decision to forego certain forms of life-prolonging treatment, the order
takes on the characteristics of a living will in advance-care planning). Typically these
are orders that tell health care providers not to perform CPR or not to place the pa-
tient on a ventilator if that becomes necessary. See I MEISEL, supra note 24, §§ 9.4-
9.8, at 543-56. See also Vassyl A. Lonchyna, To Rescucitate or Not... In the Oper-
ating Room: The Need for Hospital Policies for Surgeons Regarding DNR Orders, 6
ANNALS HEALTH L. 209 (1997) (describing DNRs and how medical personnel should
treat DNRs when caring for a patient).
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his body." 51 Later incompetence or decisional incapacity52 shall be
no bar to autonomous decision-making, for although advance di-
rectives cannot reproduce the contemporaneous decision-making
of a competent individual, they do allow individuals to "direct
their medical care, even when [they] cannot do so directly.,
53
1. The Living Will
The first form of advance directive is the living will. "Living
wills are documents that give instructions to health care providers
about particular kinds of medical care that an individual would or
would not want to have to prolong life.",54 Living wills were first
proposed in 1969 in response to newly developing technology that
prolonged the dying process,55 so that individuals would have a
means to avoid becoming "passive prisoner[s] of medical technol-
ogy."' 56 Seven years later the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
the famous Quinlan case.
57
51 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N. Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,95 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting) (holding that the hospital is not liable for surgery performed without
consent when the hospital did not have notice of lack of consent).
52 "Capacity" typically refers to a factual status regarding one's ability to make
a particular type of decision, while "competence" typically refers to a legal status.
See 1 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.5, at 114. Like Meisel, however, I will use these
terms synonymously. See id. § 4.2, at 113.
53 Joanne Lynn & Joan M. Teno, Advance Directives, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BioETHics 572, 573 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995) (discussing the history of ad-
vance directives in the United States, types of advance directives, consideration in
using advance directives, and the policy of advance directive utilization); see also In
re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) ("[B]y allowing patients to designate
individuals to consent or refuse their own health care... [the law] demonstrates re-
spect for patient autonomy").
5 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.4, at 8.
55 See Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44
IND. L.J. 539 (1969) (presenting the living will as a method by which a competent
patient could maintain autonomy by pre-dictating his treatment wishes in the event of
incompetency).
56 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Nancy Cruzan's fundamental right to choose to die with dig-
nity should outweigh the interests of the state).
57 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(holding that the father of a 21-year-old woman who was in a persistent vegetative
state could be appointed as her guardian, and upon the conclusion of attending physi-
cians and the hospital ethics committee that there was no possibility of her re-
emergence to a cognitive state, could request that her life-support systems be with-
drawn). For more background on this landmark case, see JOSEPH & JULIA QUINLAN,
THE QUINLANS TELL THEIR STORY (1977), which discusses the struggle of Karen Ann
Quinlan and the difficulties her family faced in being her surrogate decision-makers.
See also B.D. COLEN, KAREN ANN QUINLAN: DYING IN THE AGE OF ETERNAL LIFE
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Karen Ann Quinlan was a twenty-one-year-old woman con-
demned to a persistent vegetative state (PVS) after ingesting some
combination of narcotic drugs. Although she exhibited motor re-
flexes, she evinced no indicia of significant cognitive function.
Her condition was virtually certainly permanent.58 Karen Ann's
father sought judicial approval to disconnect his daughter's respi-
rator and let her body die. Unfortunately, Karen Ann had no ad-
vance directive. There was no written evidence of her preferences,
goals, or values regarding whether she would want substantial
technology keeping her alive under conditions where she could not
think, feel, or communicate. There was only informal evidence of
Karen Ann's wishes, i.e. oral communications to friends.
The New Jersey court accepted this informal evidence, hold-
ing that Karen Ann's autonomy ought not be discarded merely be-
cause she could not contemporaneously exercise it. The court
wrote, "[w]e have no doubt.., that if Karen were herself miracu-
lously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing prognosis of
the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of
her irreversible condition, she could [and would] effectively decide
upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant
the prospect of natural death."'59
Although the Quinlan court accepted this informal evidence
of Karen Ann's preferences, casual verbal comments are typically
far less likely to reflect careful deliberations and are generally less
reliable evidence of preferences. 60 Thus, the need for living wills
was recognized and states began to enact legislation authorizing
them. 6' Nevertheless, because they anticipate and plan for events
(1976) (describing the meaning and significance of Karen Ann Quinlan's life and
death).5d Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655-56 (discussing the etiology and permanence of
Karen Ann Quinlan's condition based on medical consensus).
'9 Id. at 663.
60 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285 (affirming the Missouri Supreme Court's
holding that testimony consisting of "statements made to a housemate about a year
before her accident that she would not want to live should she face life as a 'vegeta-
ble"' did not amount to clear and convincing proof of the patient's desire); In re
Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 411 (Mich. 1995) (discussed infra at notes 140-60) (stating
that evidence of a decision to forego medically necessary treatment must fulfill the
clear and convincing evidence standard).
61 California was the first state to enact such legislation in 1976. CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 .Today, advance directive statutes vary significantly in
scope and substance. See, e.g., Theodore P. Gustitus, Note, A Comparative View of
Advance Health Care Directives in Florida and North Carolina, 11 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 163 (1997) (comparing and contrasting two distinct models of statutory
construction of advance directives by discussing specific definitions and interpreta-
tions). Still, "there is no reason to believe that an advance directive executed in the
absence of a statutory basis is invalid." 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.11.
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that might never occur, living wills often require substantial inter-
pretation (e.g. what is meant by "extraordinary treatment"). So,
upon the recommendation of the 1983 Presidential Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 62 state legislatures began to enact statutes
authorizing durable powers of attorney for health care.
63
2. The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
The durable power of attorney for health care (DPAHC) is an
instrument by which an individual designates another to make
health care decisions for her. 64 The DPAHC "evades problems of
[living wills'] interpretation, but it provides no real direction for
decisions beyond the naming of a proxy." 65 This proxy or surro-
gate decision-maker has the flexibility to respond to the various
clinical situations that might arise, and as long as the patient is in-
competent, the proxy has the authority to make health care deci-
sions on behalf of the patient.
In some states this authority is constrained by the directive
contained in a living will executed concomitantly with the
DPAHC. This makes the directive more useful because it confines
the proxy's role "to implement[in ] the general desires of a person
as expressed in the 'living will"' and provides assurance that the
proxy "is implementing to the greatest extent possible the patient's
wishes." 67 Yet, even without a concomitant living will, the
DPAHC is an instrument by which patients can exercise their
autonomy by making non-contemporaneous decisions regarding
their health care.
B. The PSDA and the Execution of Advance Directives
Ideally, advance directives should be completed outside the
hospital, within the context of the patient-physician relationship
62 Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethical,
Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, 145 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT] (de-
scribing the absence of proxy and power of attorney provisions in state statutes as
"serious shortcomings").
63 See CHOICE IN DYING, supra note 29 (collecting state DPAHC statutes).
64 See 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 12.2 (defining the term "'health care power of
attorney").
65 Lynn & Teno, supra note 53, at 573 (comparing living will and durable power
of attorney with regard to interpretation and instructing provisions).
66 IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (1998) (confining proxy's decisions to guidelines
patient set forth in living will).
67 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 12.1 at 128. See infra notes 211-22.
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when the patient is healthy and before she "experiences the dislo-
cation that often attends inpatient admission." Moreover, the dis-
cussion should represent the beginning, not the end, of a dia-
logue.69 This is what patients and physicians want,70 and it is what
the PSDA aims to accomplish by requiring community education.
71
This community education is supposed to lead patients and
physicians to initiate discussions in the doctor's office, before
hospitalization. This outpatient discussion has several advantages
to hospital discussion. First, the discussion can be conducted over
several visits, leaving the patient time to consider matters and seek
further counsel in family and friends. Second, there is time to plan
to include family, friends, clergy, or lawyers in the discussion.72
The advantages of outpatient completion of advance directives are
apparent. The American Hospital Association has observed that
"[a]s a practical matter in many cases when the patient arrives at
the hospital it is too late really to effectively deal with the situa-
tion. 73 One commentator has even proposed state legislation,
modeled on the PSDA, which would legally require physicians to
provide the information to patients whenever they arrive for an
office visit. 74
68 Wolf et al., supra note 9, at 1667; see Larson & Eaton, supra note 8, at 262-
64 (discussing the Congressional testimony of medical association representatives).
69 See La Puma et al., supra note 7, at 405.
70 See Sarah Coate Johnston et al., The Discussion About Advance Directives:
Patient and Physician Opinions Regarding When and How It Should Be Conducted,
155 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1025,1025 (1995) (reporting the results of a multi-
centered study of 329 patients and 554 physicians and explaining that patients felt
that the discussion of advance directives should occur earlier than physicians did).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(E) (1994) (requiring providers to educate staff
and community on issues concerning advance directives); see also GAO REPORT,
supra note 5, at 10 (listing selected surveys that investigated whether the goals of the
PSDA are being met).
72 See Maria Torroella Carney & R. Sean Morrisson, Advance Directives: When,
Why, and How to Start Talking, GERIATRICS, April 1997, at 65, 70 (noting a discus-
sion of advance directives can take place over multiple office visits and can involve
input about family and friends); see also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 315
("Empirical evidence suggests that ... the more [it] is part of a participatory process
that extends over time, the greater the degree of patient involvement in communica-
tion and decision-making").
73 Living Wills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Medicare and Long-Term
Care of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 1 0 1s
t Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1990) (statement of
Paul C. Rettig, Director, American Osteopathic Healthcare Association).
74 Adrienne E. Quinn, Who Should Make Medical Decisions for Incompetent
Adults? A Critique of RCW 7.70.065, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 573, 599-600 (1997)
(emphasizing the importance of ensuring that patients receive accurate information
about their decision-making rights).
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The implementation of the community education requirement
provides the most visible evidence of the PSDA's beneficial ef-
fects. Across the country, hospitals and other health care providers
produce videotapes and informational booklets, deliver lectures,
and conduct workshops. Local papers and publications for seniors
regularly publish notices of these educational opportunities.75 In
addition, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
which administers Medicare and Medicaid, has done its part7 6 to
alert patients of their right to prepare advance directives through
its consumer publications.7 As a result, individuals are more
aware of advance directives than ever before. This is especially
true in the wake of the deaths of national figures such as ex-
President Richard M. Nixon who had an advance directive which
allowed him to die without use of a ventilator.78
Yet, despite increased public awareness, only ten to twenty-
five percent of the adult population has completed a formal ad-
vance directive.79 There are many reasons why individuals do not
75 See, e.g., Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1999: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 1659 (1998) (statement of Nancy
Munro, Critical Care Nurse Specialist, Georgetown University Hospital) (describing
efforts of the American Association of Critical Care Nurses in educating people about
the PSDA by stressing definition and documentation of patient preferences); New
Guide Available on Making Living Wills, CHAPEL HILL HERALD, Feb. 21, 1998, at 3
(describing a magazine published by the University of North Carolina regarding ad-
vance directives); Tony Cappaso, Seminar Explains Options for Medical Directives,
STATE J.-REG., Mar. 19, 1998, at 18 (describing medical directives, what options are
available, and where additional information can be obtained).
76 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title IV,
Subtitle B, Part 4, Subpart E, § 4751(d), 104 Stat. 1388-205 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1990)) (directing the Health and Human Services
Secretary to develop and enact a national campaign to educate the public about their
right to execute advance directives).
77 See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
PUB. No. 02175, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES (1995) (defining the purpose and types of
advance directives and listing state phone numbers for further information). See also
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Advance Directives; Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg.
33,262 (1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 417, 430, 431, 434, 483, 484, and 489) (de-
scribing public education activities undertaken by HHS, including press kits, tele-
phone hotlines, booklets, and leaflets). Some of these publications can be found at
End of Life Resources (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://ccme-mac4.bsd.uchicago.edu/
CCMEDocs/Death>.
78 Richard A. Knox, Americans Changing How They Die, TAMPA TRIB., May
29, 1994, at 18 (describing how Americans are foregoing lifesaving measures with
increasing frequency).
79 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (estimating the number of individuals
completing formal advance directives). It has been noted, however, that only "a]bout
50% of patients have an estate will, so perhaps this represents an upper limit of ex-
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execute advance directives.80 Many patients complain that it is ei-
ther just too difficult to talk about, or that they plan to do it later."'
Many providers, on the other hand, are reluctant to discuss the is-
sue because: (1) they do not know how to formulate advance di-
rectives, (2) they do not see advance directives as necessary for
young and healthy patients, (3) they are uncomfortable discussing
end-of-life issues, or (4) they are not paid for the time it takes to
discuss the issue.82
The PSDA addresses this low completion rate. It was enacted
specifically because so few individuals complete advance direc-
tives and because "the living will, and its close relative, the dura-
ble power of attorney [were] counted as abject failures with re-
pectable advance directive use." Linda Leah Emanuel, Advance Directives: Do They
Work?, 25 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 35, 36 (1995) (analyzing the use of advance direc-
tives with the use of estate wills).
80 A related problem mentioned by the GAO report is that hospitals are unable
to acquire the advance directives of even those patients who have actually completed
them. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 13. This problem should be ameliorated, how-
ever, with services provided by companies like Advance Directives, Inc. in Colum-
bia, SC, and the National Electronic Archive of Advance Directives (NEAAD) in
Cleveland, OH, which maintain electronic registries. See High-Tech Advance Direc-
tives, PEOPLE'S MED. Soc. NEWSLETTER, (People's Med. Soc., Allentown, Pa.) Feb.
1996, at 5 (explaining the function of the NEAAD in maintaining advance directives
and quickly producing them when needed).
1 See Henry J. Silverman et al., Implementation of the PSDA in a Hospital Set-
ting: An Initial Evaluation, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 502, 505 (1995) (deter-
mining that nurse-dependent PSDA programs in hospitals could be more effective);
see also Glick et al., supra note 2, at 56 (listing common reasons for not signing ad-
vance directives); Larry VanderCreek & Deborah Frankowski, Barriers That Predict
Resistance to Completing a Living Will, 20 DEATH STUD.73, 78 (1996) (identifying
potential barriers and benefits of completing living wills, through a scientific study of
medical outpatients).
82 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at I I (discussing physicians' role in hinder-
ing the development of advance directives). See also Paul R. Dexter et al., Effective-
ness of Computer-Generated Reminders for Increasing Discussion About Advance
Directives and Completion of Advance Directive Forms, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 102, 102 (1998) (stating that "little is known about how to educate and moti-
vate clinicians to solicit advance directives); Syed Zaman & Timothy Battcock,
Doctors Need to Know More About Advance Directives, 317 BRITISH MED. J. 146
(1998) (analyzing survey results of doctors indicating little knowledge of advance
directives); L.J. Marksonet et al., Implementing Advance Directives in the Primary
Care Setting, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2321, 2324-25 (1994) (discussing exter-
nal factors and individual barriers to physicians' discussion of advance directives); R.
Sean Morrison et al., Physician Reluctance to Discuss Advance Directives: An Em-
piric Investigation of Potential Barriers, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2311, 2314




spect to the protection of autonomy., 83 The PSDA aims to accom-
plish at hospital admission, what was not being accomplished be-
fore admission. Admittedly, hospital admission is not the ideal
time to obtain an advance directive. Patients are often "ill, trauma-
tized, or simply overwhelmed., 84 Yet, the time of hospital admis-
sion is often the last chance to do so before the patient becomes
incompetent. 85
Hospitals, through their agent physicians and staff, are not
required to obtain an advance directive from patients, and, in fact,
may not demand it as a condition of treatment. 86 Nevertheless,
hospitals should still try to replicate as closely as possible the ad-
vance directive discussion that takes place - or should take place -
at physicians' offices. There is little point in obtaining an advance
directive from a patient if the preferences memorialized in that pa-
tient's advance directive fail to accurately reflect what, when later
incompetent, the patient would have chosen for herself. Yet, un-
fortunately this is exactly what happens in hospitals across the
country.
H. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE PSDA
In the six years since the PSDA has been in effect, more than
one hundred articles, books, and reports analyzing the law have
been published. After exhaustive analysis of this research, one
reaches one inescapable conclusion: the PSDA is a failure by its
own terms.87 The fundamental flaw upon which I focus is that the
83 CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 261 (arguing that living wills and powers of attor-
ney do not promote patient autonomy). Professors Larson and Eaton trace the politi-
cal history of the PSDA and identify six "clearly distinguishable goals of the Act,"
but nevertheless recognize one "overarching objective" of "individual self-
determination" and promotion of "autonomy values." Larson & Eaton, supra note 8,
at 249, 256, 267.
84 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12 (explaining how the discussion about end-
of-life treatment preferences at the time of admission is a possible barrier to the de-
velopment of advance directives).
85 "Over 80% of Americans die in hospitals. Among those who die in hospitals,
many, indeed perhaps most. are incompetent ... for some period of time before their
deaths." ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS
OF SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING 1-2 (1989) (citation omitted).
86 See 42 U.S.C. § I 395cc(f)(I)(C) (1994) (stating providers may not "condition
the provision of care or otherwise discriminate against an individual based on
whether or not the individual has executed an advance directive").
87 See Larson & Eaton, supra note 8, at 284 (concluding the PSDA is only a
"modest success" at achieving the goals identified in its legislative history). See also
COMMITTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, supra note 50, at 202-03 (listing various




PSDA, in spite of its title, not only fails to assure self-
determination but actually promotes uninformed and under-
informed advance directives.
The problem, as one commentator explained, is that the
"[m]edical preferences expressed in an advance [directive] are...
not usually adequately based upon reasoning and understanding..
• .,88 This, of course, is an empirical point. To determine that this
is a problem and that better understanding ought to be required, I
turn in the second half of this section to present two popular nor-
mative positions toward advance directives: the orthodox position
which grants too much deference to advance directives and the re-
ductionist position which grants them no deference. I reject both of
these positions and, taking the middle ground, argue that we ought
to respect advance directives, but only if they reflect with suffi-
cient accuracy, the preferences of those individuals upon whom
they are binding.
A. The Empirical Research
There is a real danger that implementation of the PSDA by
U.S. hospitals is merely a formal attempt to comply with the law
rather than a real and substantial attempt to comply with the prin-
ciples of patient self-determination. My argument is that hospitals
should not apply the law in a vacuum, ignoring the quality and in-
tegrity of the advance directives they solicit. Nevertheless, empiri-
cal studies of the PSDA indicate that this is exactly what is being
done when hospital-executed advance directives fail to reflect pa-
tient preferences.
1. Legal Rights vs. Medical Knowledge
The PSDA focuses on making patients aware of their legal
rights. This is important, because not every patient has heard the
ordeals of Ann Quinlan or Nancy Cruzan. Not all patients have
read their state law authorizing advance directives. The PSDA is
aimed at remedying this ignorance, requiring hospitals to "simply
suggest [the] subject,"' informing their patients that there exist
laws in their state that give them control over their post-competent
destinies.
This narrow focus on legal rights is inappropriate. Awareness
of one's legal right to control post-autonomous medical care is
only the beginning. The right to execute advance directives, like
any legal right, is illusory without the requisite understanding to
88 Sanchez-Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 288 (evaluating the role and effect of
advance directives outside of their original North American context).
89 La Puma et al., supra note 7, at 403-04.
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effectively exercise it. Awareness of a right to prospective self-
determination takes the patient from a stage of pre-contemplation
(not aware of a need for an advance directive) to a stage of con-
templation (consideration of completing an advance directive).90
Yet, to take patients only to this stage presumes too much of
them. 9' They also need substantive information.
Awareness of a legal right does not necessarily imply the
ability to exercise it. For example, under federal law, subjects for
biomedical research are made aware of their "legal right" to dis-
continue the research at any time.92 They are even asked for writ-
ten consent to participate. Yet, it is well-established that with re-
gard to a subject's awareness of self-determination, "legal" rights
is merely a threshold matter. The right of a research subject to
withdraw at any time is meaningless if the material risks are not
disclosed. The subject would not have the relevant information
with which to make her own personal risk-benefit analysis. If the
subject has not been told that there is a risk of sterilization, for ex-
ample, then she would be unable to take this into account in de-
ciding whether to exercise her legal right not to participate in the
research. Without adequate disclosure of risks, a subject's legal
rights are effectively eliminated, because the subject would not
know either when or how to exercise them. Similarly, patients
completing advance directives also need disclosure in order to
adequately exercise their legal rights. Unfortunately, they do not
get it.93
Patients completing advance directives need to understand
two categories of issues: legal issues and medical issues. 94 Current
implementation of the PSDA focuses only on a patient's under-
standing of the legal issues only. Patients are given a copy of their
state's laws on advance directives and an informational booklet
explaining in simple language just what these laws mean.95 This
90 See Pearlman et al., supra note 22, at 355 (discussing the five basic stages of
change that a patient goes through during advance-care planning).It is not clear whether most hospitals go even this far and convey information
on legal rights in more than a perfunctory manner. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 8,
at 269-70 (reviewing empirical studies).
92 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101 to 46.409 (1997) (stating federal laws protecting
human research projects).
93 See La Puma et al., supra note 7, at 403 (stating that consent forms generally
do not give patients a clear understanding of the procedure, for reasons such as read-
ability problems).
94 They should also reflect upon social, familial, and religious issues, however, I
leave those outside the scope of this Article.
9 See, e.g., Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Advance Directives: Final Rule,
60 Fed. Reg. at 33, 263-65 (giving notice to patients of their rights regarding
PSDAs). The blueprint for many of these booklets is the Senate Special Comm. on
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awareness and legal knowledge does encourage and permit indi-
viduals to execute advance directives. Nevertheless, the objective
of the PSDA is not only to encourage the execution of advance
directives, but also to assure that those directives are reliable (i.e.
reflect the preferences of the patients bound by them).96
The emphasis in the medical,97 legal,98 and even the bioethical
literature" has been on the rates at which advance directives are
Aging, 102d Cong., CONSUMER'S GUIDE FOR PLANNING AHEAD: THE HEALTH CARE
POWER OF ATTORNEY AND THE LIVING WILL, S. PRT. 102-106 (Comm. Print 1992)
(outlining guide to assist seniors and their advocates in planning ahead for a disabling
accident or illness). Unfortunately this guide, like many of those prepared for health
care professionals, focuses only on legal rights. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Parkman &
Barbara E. Calfee, Advance Directives: Honoring Your Patient's End-of-Life Wishes,
NURSING 97, April 1997, at 49, 50-51 (discussing PSDA requirements to be followed
by health care facilities and how to implement advance directives).
96 See Larson & Eaton, supra note 8, at 256-62, 267.
97 See, e.g., Frank J. Landry et al., Increasing the Use of Advance Directives in
Medical Outpatients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 412 (1997) (studying whether edu-
cational intervention would increase patient completion of advance directives); John
E. Heffner et al., Outcomes of Advance Directive Education of Pulmonary Rehabili-
tation Patients, 155 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 1055 (1997) (dis-
cussing survey results of patients who have completed an education program and
their tendency to complete timely advance directives); Anna Maria Cugliari et al.,
Factors Promoting Completion of Advance Directives in the Hospital, 275 JAMA
578d (1996) (investigating whether the requirement to distribute information to hos-
pital patients increased completion of the health care proxy); K.K. Ishihara, Advance
Directives in the Emergency Department: Too Few Too Late, 3 ACADEMIC
EMERGENCY MED. 50 (1996); Henry S. Perkins, Are Advance Directives Becoming an
Endangered Species? 109 CHEST 299, 299 (1996) (explaining the obstacles that pa-
tients, physicians, and hospitals have regarding advance directives); Herman Small,
Increasing Completion of Advance Directives, 271 JAMA 1907 (1994) (stating in a
letter to the editor of JAMA that a simple educational intervention does not necessar-
ily increase the completion of advance directives); Denise C. Park et al., Implemen-
tation and Impact of the Patient Self Determination Act, 87 S. MED. J. 971 (1994)
(analyzing the PSDA and its impact on the number of patients using advance direc-
tives); Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care - A Case for
Greater Use, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889 (1991) (concluding from a survey of the
general population that many people can complete an advance directive in 15 minutes
or less).
98 See, e.g., David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV.
1255, 1260 (1994) (focusing on the percentages of adults who have completed ad-
vance directives); Refolo, supra note 11, at 455,457 (pointing to an expected increase
in the use of advance directives as a result of the PSDA's enactment).
99 See, e.g., Greg A. Sachs, Increasing the Prevalence of Advance Care Plan-
ning, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at S13 (discussing the need to in-
crease the use of advance-care planning after analysis of the variables and procedures
of other studies). See also, e.g., Glick et al., supra note 2, at 55 ("The most direct
indicator of the value of the PSDA is the percentage of patients.., who have signed
advance directives . . ."). But see Joan Teno, et al., Advance Directives for Seriously
Ill Hospitalized Patients: Effectiveness with the Patient Self-Determination Act and
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completed, and not on the quality of the advance directives them-
selves. Through employing the narrow measure of completion rate,
the PSDA seems to have "reinforce[d] misconceptions about what
counts as a valid advance directive."' Arguably, the PSDA has
not even done a good job of making patients aware of their legal
rights.'01 However, even if it had, awareness of legal rights or rates
of completion are not proper measures of success. The PSDA has
failed to make patients aware of how they are to meaningfully ex-
ercise those rights. It has failed to assure patients' substantial un-
derstanding of the medical issues to which their legal rights relate.
Just as a research subject cannot meaningfully exercise her
legal rights without adequate disclosure, a patient completing an
advance directive cannot exercise his legal rights without adequate
disclosure. "For a subject's consent to have meaning.. .she must
know that the consent is for research rather than for therapy ...
[and] [t]he nature of the research[,] and its potential risks must be
known."' 1 2 Certainly, both research subjects and patients complet-
ing advance directives can sign a consent form or a durable power
of attorney for health care. But, as described earlier, these are
merely formal exercises that fail to affirm the patients' autonomy
and protect them in the way-the laws were intended. Signing a
consent to medical treatment or a contract is a merely formal exer-
cise of legal rights. That consent and that contract will be invalid if
material information was withheld because under such circum-
stances a patient would not have known what she was doing.'03
Patients cannot properly exercise their legal rights under advance
the SUPPORT Intervention, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 500, 500 (1997) (observing
that increasing rates of advance directive completion may not, by itself, substantially
improve their effectiveness).
10 KING, supra note 16, at 111.
101 See Larson & Eaton, supra note 8, at 285 ( stating that"[m]ost studies suggest
that the distribution of PSDA materials has done little to increase the public's level of
understanding of advance directives").
102 KING, supra note 16, at 46.
103 See, e.g., Ahem v. Veterans Admin., 537 F.2d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 1976)
(holding plaintiff's consent invalid because defendant physicians did not disclose the
experimental nature of treatment); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186
(Minn. 1958) (holding consent not valid when plaintiff was not told that sterilization
was an inevitable outcome). See also, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITs OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 102-26 (1993) (discussing the validity of contracts with re-
spect to the informed status of the contracting parties); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (arguing
that an understanding of the psychological constraints on decision-making is essential
for the development of contract doctrine).
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directive statutes without adequate disclosure of material informa-
tion. 104
Faden and Beauchamp draw a clear distinction between for-
mal and real exercises of consent. "Sense 2" or "formal" consent
refers only to legally or institutionally effective authorization.'05 It
is sufficient for Sense2 consent that the subject or patient execute
the directive in the appropriate manner, for example, having the
directive signed, dated, witnessed, notarized, and attested to.
06
"Sense," or "real" consent, on the other hand, requires the subject
or patient to do more than "express agreement with, acquiesce in,
yield to, or comply with an arrangement or a proposal."'' 7 To give
sense, consent, the subject or patient must substantially understand
that to which she consents. Using Faden and Beauchamp's termi-
nology, the problem with the PSDA is that it ensures only sense2 or
formal consent. Patients must know not only that they are com-
pleting an advance directive, but also what they authorize when
they execute that advance directive. 0 The PSDA ought to, but
does not now, require sense, informed consent.
A few years ago, Alan Meisel, a leading expert on death and
the law, wrote an article for practicingphysicians dispelling legal
myths about terminating life support. These myths included the
belief that anything that is not specifically permitted by law is pro-
hibited, and the belief that the patient must be terminally ill for
life-sustaining treatment to be stopped. Meisel wanted to dispel
these myths, because "[p]hysicians who are not knowledgeable
about legal consideration in the care of dying patients and are
aware of the limits of their knowledge are in a better position to
seek advice, and therefore less likely to do harm, than those physi-
cians who are unaware of the limits of their own knowledge." 1
104 In the next section, I will argue that mere disclosure of information is insuffi-
cient. Patients need more than just the data; they also need an understanding, a real
appreciation of what that information means.
105 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 280 (explaining that consent ob-
tained through a legally valid procedure may not necessarily reflect a patient's truly
informed consent).
106 See 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, §§ 13.12-.20 (discussing the formalities of exe-
cutin an advance directive).
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 278 (explaining that in actual in-
formed consent situations, the patient is authorizing treatment rather than merely
assenting to the physician's authority).
108 Cf. id. at 300 (explaining that although patients may be informed of medical
treatment and may go through consent procedures, they may not know that they are
givin authorization for treatment).
Alan Meisel, Legal Myths about Terminating Life Support, 151 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1497 (1991).
110 Id. at 1497.
1999]
HEALTH MATRIX
Those who practice medicine have learned the law. It is time that
the law learned the medicine."' At present, the PSDA's "only
teeth is to require that patients be fully informed of what they can
legally do in their state."' 2 Without also ensuring adequate medi-
cal understanding, the PSDA can, at best, only encourage patients
to execute more numerous but less reliable advance directives that
neither reflect their medical preferences nor provide sufficient
guidance to health care professionals. "3
It might be argued that patients can simply ask advice if
they need assistance in completing an advance directive. The
Georgetown University Hospital policy statement, for example,
does inform patients that they may seek counsel from the De-
partments of Pastoral Care or Social Work.1 1 4 1 will discuss this
counseling below, but here it will suffice to recall the words of
Socrates: "[Ilt is likely that neither of us knows anything
worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does
not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I
am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not
think I know what I do not know."'1 5 Patients might seek coun-
sel if they know that they do not understand, but they will
probably not seek counsel if, like the uninformed research sub-
ject, they think that they already understand, unaware of the
limits of their own knowledge. Tellingly, in a recent study only
two percent of patients requested to receive additional informa-
tion on advance directives. 16
11 Unfortunately, because medical information must be tailored to individual
patients, this cannot be done in a medical journal article.
112 Scott Obemberger, When Love and Abuse Are Not Mutually Exclusive: The
Need for Government Intervention, 12 IssuEs L. & MED. 355, 362 (1997) (emphasis
added) (arguing that more government intervention in parents' health care decisions
for their children is a necessity).
113 See KING, supra note 16, at 235 (arguing that the PSDA discourages patients
from expressing their true wishes by discouraging them from providing more infor-
mation than a standard form would require).
14 See Georgetown University Medical Center Policy Statement No. 501, Patient
Self-Determination Act (Aug. 9, 1993) (on file with the hospital); see also University
of Chicago Hospital's Policy: Patient Self-Determination Act Implementation, (vis-
ited Sept. 21, 1998) <http:// ccme-mac4.bsd.uchicago.edu/ccmepolicies/uch/psda.
html>(stating that the hospital will assign a social worker to a patient who has ques-
tions regarding advance directives); see also Bryan Memorial Hospital, Advance
Directive (visited Sept. 25, 1998) <http://www.bryan.orgladvdirective.htm> (stating
that hospital staff are available to assist patients in completing advance directives).
115 PLATO, Apology, in FIVE DIALOGUEs § 27d ( G.M.A. Grube trans., Hacket
Pub. Co., 1981) (referring to a realization by Socrates that the "public m[a]n" with
whom he was speaking was no wiser than he).
116 Silverman et al., supra note 81, at 505 (explaining the results of a survey of
patients who participated in a hospital PSDA program).
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2. The Medical Knowledge
The research subject is very well-protected by federal law."
7
The subject must be made aware of what the research entails by an
explanation of those procedures that would not be performed but
for the research. Risks, benefits, and alternatives to participation
must be described. Moreover, institutional review boards (IRBs)
endeavor to ensure that the language used in consent forms is nei-
ther jargonistic nor unduly influential on a potential subject's deci-
sion to participate." s All material information must be disclosed to
the subject. Moreover, it is not sufficient that all the information is
simply "presented" to the research subject. It must be presented in
a way that is meaningful. Otherwise, it might as well have not
been presented at all." 9
Information about potential medical circumstances is just as
material to the patient completing an advance directive as to the
research subject. The advance directive form which the George-
town University Hospital gives to its patients includes a section
"Words You Need to Know," which defines eleven terms used in
other sections of the form. 20 These terms are defined outside both
their medical and social context. For example, a patient can learn
that organ donation is "[w]hen a person permits his/her organs...
to be removed after death to be transplanted for use by another
person."''2 Yet, the patient does not learn (1) that these organs in-
clude everything from corneas to saphenous vein in the leg; (2)
that these organs are urgently needed for transplant, therapy, re-
search, and education; and (3) that her body might still be properly
prepared for funeral rituals. Any or all of these might be important
"7 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101 to 46.409 (1997) (detailing the protections available
to a variety of human research subjects, including children, pregnant women, and
prisoners).
11 See Dale E. Moore, An IRB Member's Perspective on Access to Innovative
Therapy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 559, 573 (1994) (discussing how IRB members endeavor
to protect vulnerable research subjects). See also Robert A. Greenwald, Informed
Consent, in HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH: A HANDBOOK FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS 79, 79-90 (Robert A. Greenwald et al. eds., 1982) (explaining proper meth-
ods of preparing informative, clear, comprehensive, and non-deceptive consent
forms).
119 See infra notes 252-83 and accompanying text.
120 Georgetown University Medical Center, Advance Directive: Your Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care, Living Will and Other Wishes (May, 1992) (on
file with Geo. U. Med. Center) (unpublished advance directive form for use in the
District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia); see also Walter Reed Army Medical
Center, Patient Information: Advance Directive for Patients (last modified Dec. 15,
1997) <http://www.wramc.army.mil/patientinfo/definitions/htm> (providing a defi-
nition section for key terms used in advance directives).
121 Georgetown University Medical Center, supra note 120, at 1.
1999]
HEALTH MATRIX
considerations to a patient completing section three of George-
town's advance directive form.
It might be objected here that it is not the role of the hospital
to encourage patients to complete their advance directives in any
particular way, for example, by encouraging organ donation. In-
stead, information should be presented in an objective manner.
This is a compelling point, but it is well-recognized in today's
post-Enlightenment world that any context in which information is
presented can be only yet another narrative.'2 While there can be
no truly objective presentation, there may be a discernable differ-
ence between informing patients of the context of their decisions
and biasing their decisions.
Information that is presented may be framed in certain ways
that will influence or encourage patients to reach particular deci-
sions about their medical care.'23 Yet, this cannot mean that the
information must simply be left out. The organ donation question
is included on the form in the first place for a particular reason:
there is a tremendous and urgent need for organs. 24 That reason
should be passed along to the patient. Similarly, describing what is
involved in artificial nutrition may affect the patient's decision to
request it. Nevertheless, to ask the patient to decide whether she
would want artificial nutrition without providing her with a good
understanding - perhaps even a false understanding - of what it
entails makes the patient's advance directive a less reliable indica-
tion of her health care preferences. This undermines its central
purpose to protect and promote patient autonomy.
The GAO report notes that vague terms like "heroic meas-
ures" and "terminal" employed in advance directives limit the ef-
fectiveness of the advance directive. 125 This is absolutely correct.
Without an adequate understanding of these concepts, a patient
might be able to make a decision - albeit an uninformed decision -
regarding artificial nutrition and hydration depending upon
whether or not it was, for example, "the main treatment keeping
122 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 9 (1989) (theo-
rizing that fundamental changes in language yield new non-linguistic forms of be-
havior).
123 See Timothy R. Malloy et al., The Influence of Treatment Descriptions on
Advance Medical Directive Decisions, 40 . AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1255, 1258-59
(1992) (indicating that the wording of treatment descriptions can have major effects
on patient decisions to accept or reject particular medical interventions).
124 See A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for Trans-
plantation: Exploring the Alternatives, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 117 (1993) (describing
the transplantable organ shortage and alternatives for meeting the need).
125 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 (discussing how terms that can be inter-
preted differently limit the effectiveness of advance directives).
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me alive," as the Georgetown advance directive states. 26 Yet, this
decision would not be very useful to health care professionals if
the patient later becomes incompetent. It would be unclear, for ex-
ample, whether the patient would want the treatment with only: (1)
a small chance of recovery, (2) a limited recovery, (3) a recovery
which would not allow her to leave the hospital, (4) a recovery that
would leave her permanently unconscious, (5) a recovery that
would leave her with mental capacity but permanently uncon-
scious, (6) a recovery with permanent pain, or (7) a recovery re-
quiring ongoing and expensive treatment.
Meisel warns that "it is critical when specifying treatments to
be forgone that the conditions under which they are to be forgone
are also made clear."' 27 For example, if through her advance direc-
tive, a patient intended to avoid CPR in the context of an incurable
illness, it would be unfortunate if CPR were forgone in response to
a cardiac arrest in unrelated routine elective surgery from which
the patient could have been fully restored to her preoperative con-
dition. Such a result would probably not be what the patient in-
tended. Yet, such unintended results are probable. The poor read-
ability of advance directives prevents thorough understanding and
adversely influences choices in ways that thwart the true desires of
patients.
The very fact that an advance directive is unclear indicates
that the patient did not have an adequate understanding of the is-
sues when she completed the directive in the first place. Karen
Orloff Kaplan, executive director of Choice in Dying, the leading
organization promoting the use of advance directives, in an inter-
view stated that "[a]dvance directives are a two-part challenge....
The first is to get the documents properly executed, but people of-
ten stop there. If they don't take steps to ensure the documents are
honored, the first step is of no value."'2 What Kaplan overlooks is
a third step in which the patient gains sufficient understanding in
order to meaningfully execute the advance directive in the first
place. Without this third step, neither of the other steps is of any
value.
Patients' understanding of advance directives is influenced by
"syntactic complexity, concept density, abstractness, organization,
coherence, sequence of ideas, page format, length of line of print,
126 Georgetown University Medical Center, supra note 120, at 2.
127 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 13.23, at 236.
128 Clear Language Key in Making Sure Client's Advance Directive is Honored,
SERVING ELDERLY CLIENTS, Mar. 1996, at 1(finding the factors most likely to inter-
fere with the implementation of a client's advance directive are the attitudes of health




length of paragraph, punctuation, illustrations, color, and reader
interest.''29 Unfortunately, most advance directive forms currently
in use often have neither a reasonable scope nor depth.130 They do
not ask all the right questions and they do not ask those questions
in a manner that elicits clear responses.
Fortunately, with the advance directive forms themselves,
hospitals provide pamphlets that explain both the PSDA and ad-
vance directives. Thus, it seems there need not be, as some argue,
an irreconcilable tension between designing "advance directive
documents that are simple enough for patients to complete but
[comprehensive enough to] give future decision makers enough
information to make decisions that accurately reflect patient
wishes.''
One new consumer booklet asks patients to ask themselves
why they have the goals for medical treatment that they do. 132 "If
you would not want to be kept alive by a ventilator, what is it
about being on a ventilator that troubles you? Is it the loss of mo-
bility, the lack of independence, or some other factor? Would it
matter if you needed a ventilator for only a few days rather than
many months? The answers to these kinds of questions will reflect
important values that you hold and that will help you shape your
goals of treatment."43 The careful deliberation that this booklet
129 Barbara B. Ott & Thomas L. Hardie, Readability of Advance Directive
Docunents, 29 IMAGE: J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 54 (1997) (advocating revision of
advance directive documents); see also Karl Koenke, Readability Formulas: Use and
Misuse, 40 THE READING TCHR. 672, 674 (1987) (describing a Bell Labs computer
program that gives students readability feedback in several categories).
130 See KING, supra note 16, at 101 (identifying this as a problem with the
"communication" goal of advance directives). Indeed, there is a demonstrated prob-
lem that physicians routinely ignore advance directives. See Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The
Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongful
Life Analogy, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 673 (1998) (discussing doctors' failures to follow
advance directives and analyzing the legal consequences). Nevertheless, I am con-
cemed that poor validity and reliability of advance directive forms causes them, even
if followed to the letter, to be inconsistent with treatment.
131 Gary S. Fischer et al., Can Goals of Care Be Used to Predict Intervention
Preferences in an Advance Directive? 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 801, 801
(1997) (analyzing study of physicians where medical interventions are considered
with general goals of care).
132 AM. ASsoC. RETIRED PERSONS ET AL., SHAPE YOUR HEALTH CARE FUTURE
wrrH ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.ama-
assn.org/public/booklets/livgwill.htm> (providing patients with a qualitative
method of completing advance directives).
133 Id. See also DAVID J. DOUKAS & WILLIAM REICHEL, PLANNING FOR UN-
CERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO LIVING WILLS AND OTHER ADVANCE DIRECTIVES FOR
HEALTH CARE (1993) (defining and describing what values are, and discussing their
impact on health care decision-making).
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prompts individuals to make should lead to clearer and more reli-
able advance directives. Unfortunately, such efforts at patient edu-
cation are rare.
The patient must be made aware of her potential future medi-
cal circumstances. Otherwise, her advance directive is useless at
best, and at worst, it is just wrong. As the Encyclopedia of
Bioethics puts it, "[a]dvance directives can.. .be hazardous if writ-
ten without understanding."' 134 Nevertheless, some experts estimate
that only seven to forty-two percent of medical choices benefit
from accurate instructional decision-making. 35 That means fifty-
eight to ninety-three percent of choices are not implemented as
intended, making the PSDA "counterproductive."'' 36 So, the PSDA,
rather than promoting autonomy has "done a disservice to most
real patients and their families and caregivers."' 37 It has promoted
the execution of uninformed and under-informed advance direc-
tives, and has undermined, not protected, self-determination. The
PSDA looks like a utter failure. But before we draw any final con-
clusions, we must identify the normative problems with more
specificity.'
3 8
B. The Two Extreme Normative Positions on Advance
Directives
There are two popular normative views of advance directives.
The first view, exemplified in In re Martin, takes the advance di-
rective as almost conclusive evidence of the patient's health care
preferences, because it presumes that the decision-making that
went into the drafting of the directive was sound. The problem
with this position is that this presumed condition rarely obtains,
especially when the advance directive was completed pursuant to
the PSDA. 39 The second position, most famously espoused by Re-
13 Lynn & Teno, supra note 53, at 575 (discussing the possibility of an advance
directive being applicable in particular situations).
135 Emanuel, supra note 79, at 36 (citing low impact of accurate instructional
directives on medical decisions).
136 See La Puma et al., supra note 7, at 404 (stating that patients could be misin-
formed about their rights).
137 Rebecca Dresser, Confronting the "Near Irrelevance" of Advance Directives,
5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 55, 56 (1994) (discussing the need to develop formal standards
to govern the care of patients to assist them in making informed decisions about their
care).
138 Professors Larson and Eaton evaluated the PSDA on both process- and out-
come-oriented goals for the PSDA expressed by its political proponents. Larson &
Eaton, supra note 8, at 267. I am evaluating the PSDA against its central and implicit
promise to promote patient "self-determination."
1 Of course, not all advance directives are completed pursuant to the PSDA.
Indeed, some advance directives completed pursuant to the PSDA might be compre-
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becca Dresser, is more responsive to new empirical evidence. Yet,
it pessimistically holds that advance directives can never be mor-
ally valid no matter how careful the decision-making that went
into them because the drafter of the advance directive and the pa-
tient later bound by it are different "selves." Dresser's position,
which accords no respect to advance directives, represents the op-
posite extreme of the dominant approach exemplified by Martin,
which accords too much respect. I turn now to examine each of
these positions in more detail.
1. Martin and Too Much Deference to Advance Directives
In 1995, the Michigan Supreme Court handed down its opin-
ion in In re Martin,14° in which it decided that seemingly probative
evidence not recorded in an advance directive does not satisfy
Michigan's evidentiary standard for determining the health care
preferences of incompetent patients. Remarkably, however, the
court suggested that even less probative evidence would satisfy the
evidentiary standard if it simply were formally recorded in an ad-
vance directive.
Michael Martin was injured in an automobile accident "im-
pair[ing] his physical and cognitive abilities, leav[ing] him unable
to walk or talk, and render[ing] him dependent on a colostomy for
defecation and a gastronomical tube for nutrition.' 4' Michael's
wife petitioned the probate court for authorization to withdraw Mi-
chael's nutritive support.1 42 Eventually, upon being remanded, the
probate court granted the petition, holding that there was clear and
convincing evidence that termination is what Michael himself
would have wanted.143 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that there was no such clear and convincing evidence,
as required by the Michigan statute.144
The court, noting that Michael's right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment survived his incompetency, applied a subjective analy-
sis' 4 5 to determine what Michael himself would choose if he were
hensive and accurate. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that most ad-
vance directives completed pursuant to the PSDA are completed under conditions not
conducive to good decision-making.
'40 In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995) (holding that the clear and con-
vincing evidentiary standard must be met to forego life-sustaining treatment).
141 Id. at 402.
142 Id.
141 Id. at 404.
'44 Id. at 413.
145 There is a continuum of decision-making standards for incompetent patients
that can be collectively identified as employing a "'subjective" analysis. See I
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able to choose for himself.146 The court held that self-
determination requires that the patient "make" the choice if possi-
ble. 147 One way in which Michael might have done this (albeit pro-
spectively) is through an advance directive. Unfortunately, he did
not have one. The court, however, rightly still tried to give effect
to Michael's wishes, rather than to use an objective best-interest
analysis to determine whether to continue his nutritive support.
The court turned to what evidence it did have, which included tes-
timony regarding Michael's expressed preferences before his acci-
dent, that "he would rather die than be dependent on people and
machines."' 14
The evidentiary standard in Michigan, as in most jurisdic-
tions, requires that evidence of what an incompetent patient would
have wanted must be "clear and convincing."' 149 This standard is
more demanding than the usual civil standard of preponderance of
the evidence.'5° The court noted that in evaluating oral statements,
it looks to their remoteness, consistency, specificity, and solem-nity.151 The court stated it would accord oral statements authority
only when they "illustrate a serious, well thought out consistent
decision to refuse treatment under these exact circumstances, or
circumstances highly similar to the current situation."'152 The court
held that this standard was not met because there was no clear evi-
dence that Michael Martin's statements were directed precisely at
the situation in question. Michael, when he made the statements
that were entered as evidence, "was not presently experiencing and
likely had never experienced the form of 'helplessness' he suppos-
edly disliked."' 153 He was only commenting on the condition of
others rather than making a serious statement of purpose after
careful reflection.
MEISEL, supra note 24, § 7.3. The basic goal of this analysis is to identify - at some
level of specificity - the patient's "wants" as opposed to her "needs."
'46 In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, at 406-08 (Mich. 1995).
'47 Id. at 408.
'4' Id. at 402,411-12.
'49 Id. at410.
1SO See 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.34 (discussing that courts generally require
that an advance directive be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
"'i In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, at 411 (Mich. 1995).
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 Id. See also In re Westchester County Med. Cir., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-14
(N.Y. 1988) (holding that there must be more than speech to "persuade the fact finder
that her expressions were more than just immediate reactions" and that "the inquiry
must always be narrowed to the patient's expressed intent"); Eichner v. Dillon, 420
N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that oral evidence is followed only when it is
specific and a "solemn pronouncement").
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The Michigan Supreme Court required a subjective standard
to be established by clear and convincing evidence. 54 It held the
standard was not met because there was no such evidence. Re-
markably, though, the court indicated that the clear and convincing
standard would have been met, had Michael simply executed an
advance directive -- even if he had done so with no more (and
probably even less) understanding than that found in his oral
statements. 155 This is merely obiter dicta, but it is troubling.
The Michigan Supreme Court was correct to set high eviden-
tiary standards to assure that patients are bound only by their "se-
rious, well thought out, consistent decisions to refuse treatment
under highly similar circumstances."'' 56  After all, self-
determination requires that the individual be bound by only her
"self' (i.e. her authentic preferences) and not by just any stated or
expressed preference. The preferences by which a patient is bound
must "be the same as [the patient's] would have been had she been
confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent.'
' 57
This requirement of understanding should apply not only to pa-
tients without advance directives, but also to patients executing
advance directives.
The Martin court, like other courts and other decision makers,
employed different evidentiary standards depending upon whether
the evidence at issue was in the form of an advance directive. In
Martin, the Michigan Supreme Court demanded that Michael
Martin's oral statements constitute sense, informed consent. But at
the same time the court would have accepted a sense -deficient
advance directive as evidence of Michael Martin's preferences. In
154 1 use the term "subjective" in its broadest sense to encompass any decision-
making standard that is more concerned with the patient's evaluative interests than
her experiential interests. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Autonomy and the De-
mented Self, 64 MILBANK Q. 4 (Supp. 2 1986) (discussing pre- and post-dementia
rights of patients with regard to the autonomy interests).
155 In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, at 410 (Mich. 1995). Compare id. at 416
(Levin, J. dissenting) (criticizing the majority for demanding a formal advance direc-
tive as the only adequate clear and convincing evidence), with Eichner v. Dillon, 420
N.E.2d at 72 (noting that written statements do have more indicia of solemnity).
156 In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, at 410-11; see also In re Edna M.F. v. Eisen-
berg, 563 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Wis. 1997) (denying petition to withdraw petition be-
cause "the only evidence presented... regarding [the incompetent's] views on the
use of life-sustaining medical treatment involves a statement made in 1966 or 1967..
.in which [she remarked] she would rather die of cancer than lose [her] mind"). But
see Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986) (finding
non-contemporaneous statements sufficient evidence of incompetent's preferences).
157 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990) (stating that
the state may choose to defer only to the wishes of the patient considering the fact
that the views of close family members cannot be assumed to coincide with the views
of the decision the patient would make if she were competent).
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other words, the court suggested that either sense 1 or sense 2 in-
formed consent would be sufficient if in the form of an advance
directive.
The Martin court assumed that sense2 informed consent in the
form of an advance directive necessarily implied sense, informed
consent. This is somewhat reasonable. After all, the formalities of
execution do impress one "with the seriousness of purpose with
which the maker of the instrument acts."158 Still, this assumption is
erroneous. "The mere existence of an advance directive does not
mean that it should be blindly followed."' 59 The court's inconsis-
tent treatment of oral and written statements of preferences high-
lights the deference wrongly granted to advance directives just be-
cause of their formal sense2 characteristics. An advance directive
is, as Fenella Rouse describes it, "considerably better than noth-
ing." Nevertheless, "they may not always demonstrate a specific
and informed refusal of the treatment at issue in the patient's cur-
rent circumstances."
'160
2. Rebecca Dresser and the Metaphysical Objection to Advance
Directives
Unquestionably, it is important that patients completing ad-
vance directives understand the medical circumstances to which
they might later be subject. Professor Rebecca Dresser, among
others, has applied this principle very strictly, arguing that such
understanding is important not to ensure the autonomy of the deci-
sion-maker, but to ensure the autonomy of the incapacitated per-
son.161 Legally these two persons are the same (e.g. both Michael
Martin), but they are very different "selves" (e.g. Michael Martin
before and Michael Martin after the accident). On the reductionist
theory of personal identity, which Dresser espouses, the radical
differences in values, attitudes, and similar attributes which indi-
viduals often undergo when they become incompetent make the
158 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 13.11, at 227 (observing that formalities enhance
the enforceability of advance directives) see also KING, supra note 16, at 104 (ob-
serving that just completing an advance directive "encourag[es] more thoughtful
choices"); Fenella Rouse, Does Autonomy Require Informed and Specific Refusal of
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment? 5 IssuEs L. & MED. 321, 328 (1989) (observing
that courts prefer written statements "on the theory that they demonstrate that the
person formally and deliberately set out her wishes after giving thought to her precise
instructions in the circumstances delineated in the writing").
159 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.28, at 66.
160 Rouse, supra note 158, at 329 (commenting that a patient's writings often do
not demonstrate the patient's intent).
161 See infra notes 164, 173-77.
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person at the later point in time a different person. 162 In other
words, the person who wrote the advance directive is a different
"person" from the incompetent person bound by it.
Rebecca Dresser argues that personal identity problems chal-
lenge the very idea of advance directives. Dresser argues that an
individual's preferences, as expressed in her advance directive,
may be ignored because she is not in the best position to make de-
cisions for her own (future) self. Indeed, if Dresser's personal
identity premise is valid, this argument is quite convincing. Once
earlier and later selves are distinguished, the assumption of auton-
omy implicit in advance directives is undermined: one person, a
"stranger,' ' 63 simply cannot make medical decisions for another
person.164
In an important sense, Dresser's premise is valid. The person
actually facing death is not the same person as before. "[A] new
set of perceptions and feelings that were previously unknown are
now part of his or her consciousness."' 165 Arguably, one need not
even engage in philosophical or metaphysical discussion to char-
acterize the individual at a future point in time as a different
"self."'166 Empirically, the person is radically psychologically dif-
162 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 204-05, 223-26 (1984) (discussing
the reductionist theory of personal identity).
163 See KING, supra note 16, at 82-83 (explaining that one justification for ig-
noring advance directives is that the person who writes the advance directive is a
stranger to the same person in an unconscious or demented state).
164 Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmi-
ties and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 373 (1986) (discussing the pos-
sibility that a person's interests may change over time to the point that a different
person exists when the advance directive takes effect). See also Thomas May, Reas-
sessing the Reliability of Advance Directives, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS
325, 334 (1997) ("If advance directives do not reflect patient autonomy, why should
they be given any weight at all?"); see also Anne Moorhouse & David N. Weisstub,
Advance Directives for Research: Ethical Problems and Responses, 19 INT'L. J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 107, 120 (1996) ("Projecting the wishes of a previously competent per-
son onto the presently incompetent person is to impose the wishes of one person onto
a different person").
165 Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decision-making and Social Choice: Exam-
ining the "Right to Die," 77 Ky. L. J. 319, 344 (1988-89).
166 There is a debate between reductionist and nonreductionist theorists of per-
sonal identity over the moral and legal authority of advance directives. See generally
Ben A. Rich, Prospective Autonomy and Critical Interest: A Narrative Defense of the
Moral Authority of Advance Directives, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 138
(1997) (describing different views regarding advance directives, specifically those of
Rebecca Dresser, Nancy Rhoden, and Ronald Dworkin). A more immediate and
practical debate focuses on the degree of psychological continuity between the drafter
and the incompetent. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 85, at 179. See also
Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, in IN HARM'S
WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL FEINBERG 290, 302 (Jules L. Coleman & Allan Bu-
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ferent, and this alone is sufficient to raise questions as to the
authority of earlier decisions embodied in an advance directive
over a later, very differently situated and incompetent individ-
ual. 67 As Nancy King explains, this psychological difference
"challenges the validity of the patient's decision directly, by chal-
lenging the patient's ability to make it."' 6 Except in special rare
circumstances, one individual cannot make medical decisions for
another "person.
''69
Whatever one thinks of the reductionist theory of personal
identity, it certainly does not fit neatly with the way Western law
treats individuals. In particular, even if the patient qua competent
and the patient qua incompetent were different "selves," they
would still be considered as the same legal person because they
would share the same physical body. This numerical identity sug-
gests that Dresser's argument for overriding and ignoring stated
(and even adequately informed)' 70 preferences is properly charac-
chanan eds., 1994) ("Without going so far as to regard [Patient] Now as a different
person from [Patient] Then, I believe it is plain that there has occurred a great trans-
formation in her capacities and perspectives .... [Her] precedent autonomy that is so
far separated and distant from her present circumstances that its entitlement to govern
is severely compromised").
167 See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw 370 (1986) (critiquing living will legislation asking, "[c]an we be sufficiently
confident that the earlier self acting on the basis of only a partial anticipation of the
eventual situation, would not himself have chosen to revoke had he been able to fore-
see precisely these circumstances in every relevant detail?'); see also John A. Rob-
ertson, Second Thoughts on Living Wills, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at
6, 7 (indicating that patient interests change radically once they are incompetent and,
thus, their original advance directive may no longer be valid or applicable). In fact
Parfit, upon whose philosophical work Dresser bases much of her argument, thinks
that whether or not me are the "same person" is not an important or meaningful con-
cept. What matters, Parfit argues, is the degree of psychological connectedness, or
what he calls R-relations. He concedes, however, that with a sharp psychological
discontinuity a new self may emerge. PAREIT, supra note 162, at 304-05. Some have
speculated that Donald Cowart changed his name to "Dax" to mark the sharp break in
his identification of himself after his accident. See James F. Childress & Courmey C.
Campbell, Who is a Doctor to Decide Whether a Person Lives or Dies ? Reflections
on Dax's Case, in DAX's CASE: ESSAYS IN MEDICAL ETHIcs AND HUMAN MEANING
23, 36 (Lonnie D. Kliever, ed. 1989) (noting that the name change may serve as a
separation of the present and future from the painful past). For an exceptionally lucid
statement of the personal identity objection to advance directives, see BucHANAN &
BROCK, supra note 85, at 155-58.
168 KING, supra note 16, at 68.
169 One notable exception is the DPAHC, whereby a proxy is chosen by the pa-
tient to make health care decisions on her behalf should the patient become incom-
petent to do so herself. See supra notes 64-67.
170 The problem is not that competent patients are irrational. In fact, their deci-
sions may be perfectly rational for themselves at the time they are made. The prob-
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terized as "hard paternalism."17' Unlike traditional hard paternal-
ism, which is justified on the basis of the (same) patient's subse-
quent consent, 172 this paternalism is justified on the basis of the
hypothetical ratification of the patient very differently situated at a
future time.
Dresser asks, "the later self's best interests are defined by that
individual at an earlier point in time, rather than by another party.
Ought this difference be sufficient to remove the ethical and legal
concerns paternalism typically elicits?"' 173 She answers, "the fact
that the decision-maker and the subject of paternalism share the
same body fails to insulate self-binding arrangements from the
scrutiny paternalistic interventions generally receive.' 174 Dresser
argues that the decision-maker and the individual bound by the
decision are sufficiently different that those decisions made at an
earlier time and place should not control the individual at a future
time and place. She argues, therefore, that advance directives lack
the moral force of a contemporaneous treatment choice,175 and are
lem is that they might not be rational for themselves at a future time. See Dan W.
Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent Patients Make Irrational Choices, in
LIFE AND DEATH: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 80 (Dan W. Brock
ed., 1993) (discussing the standards of rational decision-making and how those stan-
dards apply to patients' present and future choices).
171 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 12 (1986) (defining and comparing "hard pa-
ternalism" and "soft paternalism").
172 See Childress & Campbell, supra note 167, at 34-35 (noting that a physician
must appeal to a patient's values over time in order to justify treatment).
173 Rebecca S. Dresser, Advance Directives, Self Determination, and Personal
Identity, in ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN MEDICINE, 155, 160 (Chris Hackler et al. eds.,
1989) (questioning the best-interest issue within an advance directive, where a person
makes a future best-interest decision without the particular facts about the event upon
which they will decide).
174 Id. This is also known as the issue of the "double reference point." It is un-
clear whether obligations run to the wishes of author of the advance directive or to
the interests of the incompetent patient. See Moorhouse & Weisstub, supra note 164,
at 114.
175 See Dresser, supra note 173, at 157 (citing Allen Buchanan, The Treatment of
Incompetents, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 215, 215-38 (T. Regan
ed., 1987)). See also Robertson, supra note 167.
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just "irrelevant"' 176 and "meaningless"'' 7 when deciding medical
care for the incompetent patient.
178
The basic rationale of Dresser's argument has achieved some
resonance in bioethical literature and policy. The problems associ-
ated with decision-making for differently situated future selves has
been recognized in the context of surrogate motherhood con-
tracts. 79 Martha Field explains that there is a degree of coercion
and information failure on the part of the birth mother because she
underestimates the strength of gestational bonding and the psy-
chological costs of disrupting those bonds. 80 The birth mother,
like the drafter of an advance directive, has difficulty anticipating
future hypothetical circumstances. Accordingly, Field argues that
birth mothers should have a short time to opt out of the contract.181
Another context in which personal identity concerns were co-
gently raised was in the debate over the Oregon Medicaid Demon-
stration Project. 82 In 1993, Oregon radically modified the scheme
by which the state distributed Medicaid benefits. The state wanted
to achieve the greatest health benefit with each dollar it spent. In
176 Rebecca Dresser, Advance Directives: Implications for Policy, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at S2, S3 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S Do-
MINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
226 (1993)).
177 Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment
Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 234,238 (1989).
178 Sanford Kadish takes a less-extreme position, holding that advance directives
still have some force to be balanced against experiential interests of the incompetent
patient. See Kadish, supra note 166, at 302-03, 312.
'79 Id. at 320, n.179.
180 MARTH FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 151-52 (1988) (arguing that surro-
gacy contracts should not be encouraged because of society's interests in preventing
the exploitation of women). Cf. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (explain-
ing that a mother should fully understand the consequences of her decision to give up
her rights to her child and should fully appreciate the importance of that decision).
181 FIELD, supra note 180, at 93 (arguing that once a surrogate mother has con-
sented to adoption, she must show proof of coercion or fraud in order to revoke her
consent to the adoption). Many states have incorporated Field's advice. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ch. 63.212(l)(i)(2)(a) (1997) (giving the volunteer mother a "right of
rescission" during "any time within 7 days after the birth of the child").
182 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL (1992) (describing the proposed
Medicaid program, and discussing the likely implications on the Federal Govern-
ment, the state of Oregon, and Medicaid beneficiaries). See also Catherine
GraceVanchiere, Stalled on the Road to Health Care Reform: An Analysis of the Ini-
tial Impediments to the Oregon Demonstration Project, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 405, 419-30 (1994) (analyzing the constraints placed upon the Oregon Dem-




order to do this, Oregon had to measure medical benefit in a wide
variety of medical interventions. The state obtained the informa-
tion to rank over 700 treatments and conditions from severe head
injury to sprained wrist, by having citizens complete question-
naires by telephone or mail.
The problem, as soon became evident, was that the perceived
benefit of some interventions was undervalued. Particularly under-
valued interventions were those for individuals with disabilities.
Respondents did not think expensive wheelchairs and portable
ventilators were important, because they felt that the disabled
quality of life was very low and could not be significantly
raised. 183 Nevertheless, not surprisingly, once patients became ill,
they were far more likely to prefer a longer life with a disability
than a short one without it.18 The healthy Oregonians failed to
vividly imagine what life with a disability would really be like.
Similarly, in the advance directive context, competent individuals
fail to vividly imagine what life as an incompetent patient would
really be like. Yet, like the healthy Oregonian, they still must make
decisions for their later selves as very differently situated indi-
viduals.
Most persons completing advance directives underestimate
the quality of life with disability'85 because individuals with dis-
abilities adapt to their disabilities. In one study "no differences
were found with respect to [quality-of-life] indicators: satisfaction
with family, friends, work, income, values, activities, community,
183 See David C. Hadorn, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life
and Public Policy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at 11, 12 (reviewing the
Oregon Basic Health Services Act and its treatments that were ranked low in the
"poor-outcome" category based on quality of life).
184 See Dan W. Brock, Justice and the ADA: Does Prioritizing and Rationing
Health Care Discriminate Against the Disabled?, 12 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 159 (1995)
(discussing the perspective problem between disabled and nondisabled persons in
prioritizing medical treatments available in regards to quality of life). See also David
C. Hadom, The Problem of Discrimination in Health Care Priority Setting, 268
JAMA 1454, 1455(1992) (discussing the problems with attempting to put a value or
disvalue on certain disabilities for purposes of distribution of health care resources);
Paul T. Menzel, Oregon's Denial: Disability and Quality of Life, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 21(discussing the issues surrounding medical decisions that
are made based on quality of life judgements). See generally Michael O'Donnell,
One Man's Burden, 291 BRITISH MED. J. 1513, 1513 (1985) (acknowledging the need
for medical research, but expressing concern that the "race for the cure" leaves doc-
tors devoid of caring for their patients).
185 See generally Stuart Homett, Advance Directives: A Legal and Ethical Analy-
sis, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 297,
308 & n.64 (John Keown ed., 1995) (noting that in the realm of terminal health care,
patients are likely to have an unduly pessimistic view of the quality of life attainable
during the process of death).
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local government, health, quality of life, psychological function-
ing, anxiety, depression, positive well-being, general mental well-
being, daily activities, and work satisfaction."' 86 Clearly, some
paternalism is needed to counteract natural psychological tenden-
cies to exaggerate unknown risks. 187 Nevertheless, Dresser argues
that the problem with advance directives goes much deeper than
this. The real problem is that individuals are making decisions for
their future selves that those future selves would not want made.
Dresser argues that when individuals make decisions for their
future-selves they are making decisions for different persons alto-
gether. Therefore, according to Dresser, an advance directive,
which allows this future-oriented decision-making, cannot promote
autonomy. An advance directive cannot help one be in control of
one's life. Instead, according to Dresser, advance directives pro-
mote "heteronomy."' 188 The directive (nomos) for the future self is
made by another (hetero) person.
Dresser takes a radical approach to dealing with the iden-
tity/heteronomy problem with advance directives. 89 She writes,
"instead of giving presumptive authority to [advance directives],
the courts should adopt an objective standard to guide decision-
making for incompetent patients. Under such a standard medical
decisions regarding incompetent patients are made by weighing the
186 Johanna CJ.M. de Haes & Ferdinand C.E. van Knippenberg, Quality of Life
of Cancer Patients: Review of the Literature, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF CANCER
PATIENTS 167, 170 (Neil K. Aaronson & John Beckmann eds., 1987) (examining
quality of life factors of cancer patients, in comparison to those of other patients or
nonpatients).87 See Julian Savulescu, Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 8 BIOETHICS 191, 206-07 (1994) (advocating that treatment limitation be
in accordance with a patient's rational desires, not merely her expressed desires).
188 Compare the definition of "heteronomy," in THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1227 (1993) ("[s]ubjection to an
external law or power") wtith the definition of "autonomy," in id. at 153
("[i]ndependence, freedom from external control or influence; personal liberty"). See
generally HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM (1990) (discussing het-
eronomy and Kant's views on freedom and rational agency, his conception of moral
agency, and his attempts to justify moral law). Oliver Johnson, Heteronomy and
Autonomy: Rawls and Kant, in MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 277 (Peter A.
French et al. eds., 1977) (describing Kant's theory that if an individual promotes self-
interest by monitoring other's interest, then that person is acting heteronomously and
not autonomously).
189 See Rebecca Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 434
(1990) (arguing that the moral obligation to protect incompetent patients should over-
rule living wills); Dresser, supra note 164, at 385 (arguing that the court's application
of the best interests standard to incompetent patients is improper because these pa-




benefits and burdens of treatment. The considerations that typi-
cally factor into this analysis include the patient's pain, indignity,
quality of life, and social utility. 19° An objective standard holds
that "[d]ecisions should rest on observers' systematic evaluations
of the patient's present capacities and experiences, because these
are the only things that now matter to this individual. '191 While a
subjective standard focuses on the patient's wishes and implements
them either as embodied in actual decisions or as inferred from
statements and conduct, a best interest standard is unconcerned
with the patient's "wants" and instead focuses on her "needs."'
92
Dresser moves too quickly to an objective standard, and she takes
the individual completely out of the picture in deciding her own
future. The objective standard is generally considered to be a last
resort. 93 The 1983 President's Commission, for example, recom-
mended that "when possible, decision-making for incapacitated
patients should be guided by the principle of substituted judgment,
which [best] promotes the underlying values of self-determination
.... ,194 Nevertheless, Dresser argues that the objective standard
is appropriate because any preferences expressed prior to incom-
petence either orally or in an advance directive are now irrelevant.
Therefore, although the subjective standard is preferred, there just
cannot be any subjective evidence of what an incompetent patient
wants. 195
Buchanan and Brock agree with Dresser that less confidence
should be accorded to advance directives than to the contextual
190 See 1 MEISEL, supra note 24, §§ 7.11-.25 (proposing the use of the best-inter-
ests standard in right-to-die cases).
191 Dresser, supra note 189, at 437 (emphasis added). See also Dresser & Robert-
son, supra note 177, at 238 (arguing that orthodox advance directives overlook the
interests patients may have in continued life in their diminished state).
192 See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (NJ. 1985) (limiting considera-
tions to experiential interests like pain and enjoyment).
193 I MEISEL, supra note 24, § 7.2 (explaining in detail the hierarchy of standards
for surrogate decision-making); see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and
Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 404 (1988) (explaining that under the pure-objective
test, only a few patients meet the standard to justify non-treatment). Cf AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASS'N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 2.20, at 36-37 (1994) (suggesting
that a competent, adult patient's wishes or the decision of a surrogate decision-maker
should be honored absent evidence the directive is not in the patient's best interests).
194 1983 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 62, at 136 (comparing
substituted judgement with the best interests standard).
195 Dresser would hold there is no difference between Martin and cases like Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977); or In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), in which the patients in question
were severely retarded from birth and, thus, were never able to express their desires.
For both sets of patients all that matters is their present experiential interests.
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circumstances of the incompetent. 96 They too recognize that there
are, as they describe it, "morally significant asymmetries between
the contemporaneous choice of a competent individual and the is-
suance of an advance directive to govern future decisions."'197 Bu-
chanan and Brock concede that "the assumption that a person is
the best judge of his or her own interests is weaker in the case of a
choice about future contingencies under conditions in which those
interests might have changed in radical and unforseen ways."'
198
However, in contrast to Dresser, Buchanan and Brock conclude
that, in spite of these "asymmetries," we still ought to recognize
advance directives as having force. 199
Buchanan and Brock recognize that, in order to protect auton-
omy, our objective ought to be to provide the care that the now
incompetent patient would have chosen had she considered the
issue while competent. Buchanan and Brock are reluctant to give
up altogether on the idea of advance directives as Dresser would
have us do. Instead, they are optimistic that advance directives can
serve to promote prospective autonomy. 2°° I am similarly optimis-
tic that we can ensure that advance directives are accurate for
those who are bound by them -- even when they are completed at
the less-than-ideal time of hospital admission.
There is a presumption in favor of prospective autonomy.
Dresser is right to question the conceptual underpinnings of this
presumption. Nevertheless, it ought not be rebutted as easily and
196 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 85, at 107.
'97 Id. at 103, 152.
198 Id. at 153. See also Kadish, supra note 166, at 300 ("[The fact that advance
directives are executed as future hypotheticals deprives them of the full moral force
of contemporaneous choices. Unforseen changes, such as new medical treatments,
may substantially alter the person's interests. Moreover, the effect of severe, life-
imperiling illness may well effect a marked revision in the attitudes and values of the
person," citing Dresser, supra note 164, at 381); see also May, supra note 164, at 333
("We must be cautious, then, in ascribing to advance directives the moral weight of a
competent patient's decision"). Id. at 325 ("[We should not recognize advance di-
rectives as equivalent to the decisions made by a competent patient"); Moorhouse &
Weisstub, supra note 164, at 117 (arguing that, for this reason, advance directives for
research are too weak to justify nontherapeutic research).
199 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 85, at 154 (implying that relying on these
asymmetrics alone might not be enough justification for limiting the authority of
advance directives).
20o See May, supra note 164, at 335 ("[A]dvance directives do not reflect auton-
omy per se, but rather act as predictors of what autonomous decisions would be
taken") (citing L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care - A Case for
Greater Use, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 889-95 (1991)). May, supra note 164, at 337
("[Advance directives] do seem to provide a mechanism for incorporating the values




quickly as Dresser does. 201 I agree with Nancy King that we can
still shore up the "conceptual foundation . .. of advance directives
... autonomy." 202 Although the "uncertainty can be improved, [it]
... can never be eliminated." 20 3 This can be done by strengthening
the psychological connections between the earlier and later selves
and overcoming psychological discontinuity and heteronomy
through informed consent.
III. INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE PROVIDES
THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF
THE PSDA'S SELF-DETERMINATION
Before proceeding with an informed consent analysis of ad-
vance directives and the PSDA, I will establish that this is the ap-
propriate form of analysis. It might be objected that the use of in-
formed consent is improper, because at the time an advance direc-
tive is completed, there is no imminent intervention to which con-
sent is required and that there are simply too many potential and
unforeseeable interventions for which to obtain informed consent.
In this section, I respond to this objection and then develop an in-
dependent positive reason why informed consent analysis is ap-
propriate for advance directives.
A. Informed Consent Is Not Just for Contemporaneous
Interventions
Informed consent is typically obtained in the contexts of a
patient or research subject facing an immediate real-time diagnos-
tic procedure, treatment, or medical intervention.2 4 Only in such
201 1 cannot here systematically present an ethical foundation for prospective
autonomy. Rather, I take it as a starting point. See Norman L. Cantor, The Real Ethic
of Death and Dying, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1718, 1730 (1996) (stating "[the over-
whelming weight of judicial and legislative sentiment endorses prospective auton-
omy"); see also NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTVES AND THE PURSUIT OF
DEATH WITH DIGNITY 23-72, 122-34 (1993) (exploring the effectiveness of advance
directives for achieving prospective autonomy, including the issues of drafting and
enforcing advance directives). I do assume an evidentiary view of autonomy, that
persons are the best judges of their own best interests. Contra Ronald Dworkin,
Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK Q. 4, 13 (Supp. II 1986) (taking an
"integrity view" that persons ought to govern their lives according to a coherent
scheme of value, and arguing, therefore, that "past decisions ... be respected even if
they do not represent, and even if they contradict, the desires [the decision-maker]
has when we respect them").
202 KING, supra note 16, at 103.
203 Id. at 80.
204 Compare State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989) (patient made contem-
poraneous decision to discontinue ventilator), with In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399
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circumstances is there a concrete, identifiable intervention to
which consent can be given.
In the advance directive context, on the other hand, because
any "consent" is contingent on unknowable future events, in-
formed consent is not as zealously pursued. As long as the patient
is "competent," it is presumed that she is able to direct her own
health care for the period for which she might be incompetent. The
patient need only have the "capacity to understand the material
information, to make a judgment about the information in light of
[one's] values, to intend a certain outcome, and to freely commu-
nicate [one's] wish to caregivers." (emphasis added) 205
A competence standard is insufficient to protect patient
autonomy.2 6 Not just the capacity for understanding, but actual,
substantial understanding must be required. The material informa-
tion must be given. It is not sufficient that the patient be an
autonomous person who formally certified (sense 2) an advance
directive. "The autonomous person may fail to act autonomously
[sense] in a specific situation .... ,207 The certification itself must
be an autonomous act. Therefore, not just competence but in-
formed consent must be required of patients completing advance
directives. As the Encyclopedia of Bioethics puts it, "[a]dvance
directives are limited by being no better than the counseling that
preceded them.
' 20 8
It might be objected that informed consent is too burdensome
in the advance directive context, that it is impossible to write a
directive that leaves no room for interpretation.209 It is impossible
to anticipate all the medical conditions which one might confront.
"Human foresight being what it is, it is impossible for individuals
(Mich. 1995) (ruling on a case in which patient's surrogates tried to implement pa
tient's previously expressed wishes).
205 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 20, at 135; see also BUCHANAN &
BROCK, supra note 85, at 23-25 (citing the capacity for understanding and communi-
cation, along with the capacity for reasoning and deliberation as two necessary com-
ponents of establishing competence).
206 See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 85, at 136 (arguing that defense should
be given to family members of incompetent individuals as the primary decision-
makers).
207 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 237 (explaining that sometimes
autonomous people fail to act autonomously in giving consent, thereby causing their
consent to fail even though it was formally certified as informed consent).
208 Lynn & Teno, supra note 53, at 575 (arguing that caregivers have an obliga-
tion to counsel patients appropriately regarding the use of advance directives).
209 See Linda Emanuel, What Makes a Directive Valid, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, at S27, S28. ("[P]re-drafted documents must provide preference
options that bear established relationships to the most common decisions that need to




to specify with precision all the events that might arise and what
sorts of treatment they would or would not want if those conditions
were to materialize.
'210
This foreseeability objection is inapposite because advance
directive informed consent would be too burdensome only if it re-
quired the same degree of particularity as contemporaneous in-
formed consent.2 ' In fact, it does not. Advance directive informed
consent need not demand this degree of particularity. Indeed, be-
cause such a demand is impossible to meet, it would render ad-
vance directives useless. Informed consent can be lower because
the availability of durable powers of attorney for health care en-
ables the preferences embodied in a living will to be extrapolated
by the proxy.
Typically, DPAHCs take effect when the patient is unable to
make or to communicate a health care decision.212 The patient, via
a proxy, can retain not only the right to control health care deci-
sions, but also the ability to do so with the flexibility that is so of-
ten necessary in the clinical context.213 Drawing up a living will is
like laying down legislation for one's future incompetent life.
Having a DPAHC is like having someone very familiar with the
legislative history and intent to be the judge making the statutory
interpretation in light of actual circumstances.214
The availability of DPAHC allows informed consent for liv-
ing wills to be lower than that required for contemporaneous inter-
210 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.7, at 20. See also In re Westchester County
Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 614 (N.Y. 1987) ("[H]uman beings are not capable of
foreseeing either their own medical condition or advances in medical technology");
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (" [lit is definitionally impossi-
ble for a person to make an informed decision - either to consent or to refuse - under
hypothetical circumstances"), affd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
211 Surprisingly, some judicial opinions actually seem to demand this level of
particularity. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984) ("must satisfy the same standards of knowledge and understanding re-
quired for informed consent"); see also 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.7, at 17 n.57
(citing cases from Florida, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania).
212 See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing how a health care power of
attorney works and when it usually takes effect).
213 Marion Davis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-
Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 887 (1991) (suggesting the use of ad-
vance directives, but questioning their effectiveness).
214 Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)
(discussing generally the implications of statutory interpretation), WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 733-806 (1988) (explaining means by which
courts may interpret statutes, including the history of the statute, comments made
during its drafting, and relevant public policy considerations).
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ventions. However, it does not mean it can be eliminated. There
are two reasons why DPAHCs should be complemented by living
wills and the living wills, in turn, should be completed with in-
formed consent. First, surrogate decision makers often desire some
guidance. They do not want to feel the full burden of responsibility
for "pulling the plug" of a family member or friend.215 The "well-
documented if surprising inability of most spouses ...to accu-
rately predict [patients'] actual prior wishes",216 further explains the
reluctance of surrogates to act without direction. As long as there
is a significant discrepancy between the wishes of previously com-
petent patients and the beliefs of their proxies as to what the pa-
tients would want - and the evidence suggests that this is the case
- the autonomy of those patients is not preserved.217 A living will
provides a framework within which the DPAHC can be applied.
To be a workable framework, the information in the living will
must be reliable.21 8
The second reason living wills are needed to supplement
DPAHCs is that if the patient herself had no real understanding of
what she might have wanted, the surrogate will be in a formally
legal, but substantively empty position to exercise the patient's
desires. 219 As Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court
explained, "it is not the mere signing over of authority that makes
the resulting decision an expression of the patient's right of self-
determination. '"' 2 The proxy might be able to learn about the
medical prognoses and "apply" the patient's values. Yet, if the pa-
tient never understood her circumstances, the proxy cannot know
215 See Steven R. Stieber, Right to Die: Public Balks at Deciding for Others,
HosPITALs, Mar. 5, 1982, at 72 (stating that only 46% of Americans would be willing
to disconnect life support).
216 Emanuel, supra note 79, at 36 (citing evidence that proxies are often unaware
of patient preferences).
217 See Cantor, supra note 201, at 1732 n.61 (noting that the problem with the
substituted judgment standard lies within its administration because reliance on value
and character-related information about the patient may create uncertainty about what
the patient would have desired). See also Joel Tsevat et al., Health Values of Hospi-
talized Patients 80 Years or Older, 279 JAMA 371, 373 (1998) (discussing the re-
suits of a study assessing the health values of older hospitalized patients as compared
with those of their surrogate decision-makers).
218 See, e.g., KING, supra note 16, at 55-56 (noting the impact of Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), on states' legislative activities with re-
spect to statutory advances in healthcare decision-making rights through living wills).
219 See Rhoden, supra note 193, at 377 (arguing that without a living will, proxy
decisions "do not, properly speaking, implement the patient's right to choose, be-
cause the patient has made no actual choice").
220 Matter of Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 457 n.10 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring)
(holding that the right of a patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may be
exercised by a family member or close friend).
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how the patient's values or desires might have been shaped in light
of knowledge of varying medical and life conditions. 22'
To further illustrate that proxies need the guidance of a living
will executed with informed consent, take the Georgetown advance
directive. It offers the patient a choice between wanting or not
wanting artificial nutrition and hydration based on whether or not
it would be the "main treatment keeping me alive." This is a vague
expression of treatment preferences. A patient's desire for artificial
nutrition and hydration may vary according to prognosis and con-
dition. Artificial nutrition and hydration may be desired if the pa-
tient is conscious and has a reversible condition, but unwanted if
the patient is in a persistent vegetative state. Unless the patient was
aware of these potentially different circumstances at the time she
executed her advance directive, it will be difficult for her proxy to
extrapolate the expressed desires to unanticipated situations, be-
cause those desires just would not have ever been explored with
sufficient thoroughness. Thus, as Alan Meisel observes, only a
combination directive (a living will in addition to a DPAHC)
avoids the pitfalls of either, and "permits the spirit of the declar-
ant's instructions to govern, with [only] the interstices filled in by
the proxy.
' ' 97
B. Informed Consent Shares the Same Theoretical Basis as
Advance Directives
A final reason that the informed consent paradigm is appro-
priate for the analysis of the problems with the PSDA is that ad-
vance directives grew out of the "right not to consent, that is, to
refuse [medical] treatment," which is itself a "logical corollary of
the doctrine of informed consent. ' 23 The President's Commission
221 See Fischer et al., supra note 131, at 806 (explaining that some research has
been done on eliciting goals of care from patients and stating that some commenta-
tors conclude that general information about patient's values and goals can comple-
ment, though not replace, specific intervention preferences).
222 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.4, at 10.
223 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (noting that
the advance of medical technology has lead to an increase in cases involving the right
to refuse treatments). See also In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 819 (N.J. 1975) (dis-
cussing the refusal to apply patient's prior informal consent to present medical situa-
tion), rev'd, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See gener-
ally 1 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 3.5, at 86 n. 20 (discussing the development of the
law of informed consent); BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 85, at 101 ("[concems
about [the] validity... [of] advance directives ... has an analog in the conditions for
informed consent"); Holly Coldwell Gieszl & Peggy Addington Velasco, The Cruzan
Legacy: Legislative and Judicial Responses and Insights for the Future, 24 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 719, 728 (1992) (explaining that competent patients may refuse medical treat-
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for the Study of Ethical Problems with Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research wrote that the principle of self-
determination is the basis of both informed consent and the right to
forgo life-sustaining treatment.224 Since the time of the President's
Commission in 1983, "[advance directives] have come to be
looked upon as a mere extension of the doctrine of Informed Con-
sent.
' '2
Notably, the Supreme Court in Cruzan found a liberty interest
in refusing unwanted treatment protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court,
following a long line of state informed consent cases, held that the
"doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompass-
ing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treat-
ment," even if the refusal is not contemporaneous. 226 In later deci-
sions, the Court clarified that this right was "not simply deduced
from abstract concepts of personal autonomy," but from the "long
legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical
treatment" 227 and from "well established, traditional rights to bod-
ily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." 2 In both the-
ory and practice, the "[1]egal doctrine governing end-of-life medi-
cal care [and advance directives relies on] . .. the doctrine of in-
formed consent, a doctrine based on notions of bodily integrity and
self-determination."229
Nancy King is right, we must "plac[e] the issue of the pa-
tient's treatment decisions within a larger context of discussion:
the principles that properly underlie morally and legally justifiable
decision-making in health care [viz.] ... informed consent."' 0 The
concept of informed consent, in turn, must be placed in the context
of autonomy, the notion that the individual is "master of his own
body."23' Norman Cantor observes that "[the] primacy of auton-
omy extends to "prospective autonomy" - a competent person's
right to shape her post-competence medical treatment by advance
ment and with valid advance directives they may control their medical care after
becoming incapacitated).
224 See 1983 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 62, at 43-45 (dis-
cussing the elements of good decision-making and its effect on self-determination).
225 Sanchez-Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 286.
226 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
227 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270 (1997).
228 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S 793, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1997).
229 Cantor, supra note 201, at 1729.
2,' KING, supra note 16, at 43.
211 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960); see also Schoendorff v.
Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (holding that a patient has a right
not to consent to an operation and stating that "[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body").
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instructions. ''232 However, prospective autonomy manifested
through advance directives is illusory without adequate informed
consent. So, we turn now to examine what informed consent ought
to require of advance directives.
IV. A PROPOSAL: INFORMED CONSENT FOR
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
It is to "hyper-rationalize ' '2 3 to presume that patients com-
pleting advance directives are able to properly and fully take ad-
vantage of the law. Hospital patients are not abstracted, objectively
defined, prudent patients. They are patients in need of assis-
tance.234 Choices regarding future medical treatment cannot be
autonomous unless they are both informed and understood.
Patients often do not have sufficient material information to
form preferences to express in an advance directive. Moreover, to
the extent the necessary information is conveyed to patients, it is
not communicated in a way that fosters understanding. Autonomy
requires positive duties to promote the conditions for rational in-
formed decision-making. These include not only disclosure of
material information but also conveyance of this information in a
manner that enhances its understandability. In this section, I will
discuss what information ought to be disclosed and how that in-
formation ought to be disclosed to ensure adequate understanding.
A. The Material Information
"Patients increasingly expect to know not only their diagno-
ses, but also details of pathophysiology, treatment options, and
prognosis.,,235 "To enable the patient to chart his course under-
standably, some familiarity [on the part of the patient] with the
therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes essential. '26
The court in the classic informed consent case Canterbury v.
232 Cantor, supra note 201, at 1729.
233 See Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics With a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075, 1076
(1994) (defining hyper-rationalism as "the tendency to believe, first, that people be-
have in ways that can so far be predicted a priori that empirical evidence about their
behavior is superfluous and, second, that people think and act rationally, seeking
alwys to maximize and exercise autonomy").
See Lachlan Forrow, The Green Eggs and Ham Phenomena, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at S29 (analogizing advance directive decision-making to the
Dr. Seuss story to illustrate patients' need for assistance in areas where they are in-
formed).
235 Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-Centered Medicine: A Profes-
sional Evolution, 275 JAMA 152 (1996).
236 Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-
Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221, 2223 (1992).
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Spence explained, "[tihe average patient has little or no under-
standing of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician
to whom he can look for enlightenment" with which to "evaluate
knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon
each... [and] reach an intelligent decision." 237 The emphasis has
been on a patient-oriented standard by which the physician has a
duty to disclose those facts which a reasonable patient would con-
sider material to his decision. The physician must provide appro-
priate facts to empower the patient to use her values to determine
what interventions should be implemented. 238
In the advance directive context, the scope of disclosure
should ideally include: (1) a "description of [various potential]
life-sustaining treatments," (2) "the patient's health at the time of
discussion," (3) "the chance of surviving," (4) "the probability of
full recovery," and (5) "the effects of life-sustaining treatment on
the patient's family." 239 Of course, because informed consent in
the advance directive context is prospective, the disclosure must
anticipate what is material. However, this is not as difficult as it
sounds. Some conditions and interventions are more likely to be
encountered than others.
Specifically, patients can learn that some procedures, like
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) which is an intervention
widely recognized in the general population to be a successful
first-aid response to acute reversible cardiac or respiratory arrests,
might not be best for them. It would seem anathema to patients to
decline CPR when they recognize it to be a simple successful in-
tervention. Nevertheless, in fact, CPR is not desirable under all
circumstances.
237 Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a phy-
sician has an obligation to supply those facts that a reasonable patient would need in
order to make an informed treatment decision).
238 Laine & Davidoff, supra note 235 (commenting on the shift toward patient-
centered care and the growing number of patients who want more information dis-
closed). See also Jay Katz, Informed Consent: Must it Remain a Fairy Tale? 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 70-77 (1993) (discussing informed consent and
what is needed in a proper doctor-patient relationship).
239 Johnson et al., supra note 70, at 1028 (discussing patient's beliefs on what
they thought should be included in discussions regarding advance directives). Cf
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 1972) (discussing the scope of informed
consent). Two new books do a good job of describing the technology of intensive
care and guiding the individual through the choices that are embodied in an advance
directive. See generally EvAN R. COLLINS, JR. & DORAN WEBER, THE COMPLETE
GUIDE TO LIVING WILLS: How TO SAFEGUARD YOUR TREATMENT CHOICES (1991) (a
general guide to creating a living will); see generally B.D. COLEN, THE ESSENTIAL
GUIDE TO A LIVING WILL: How TO PROTECT YOUR RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL
TREATMENT (1991) (describing the technology of intensive care and guiding the lay
individual through the choices that are embodied in an advance directive).
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Recent studies indicate that only 0% to 25% of hospital-
ized patients who undergo CPR survive to discharge from
the hospital, and those have a survival after discharge from
the hospital that is often marked by a poor quality of life.
When patients learn of these outcomes, they usually curb
their overestimation of the value of CPR and request limi-
tations of life-support based on their health at the time
CPR may be required, the likelihood of survival after CPR,
and their probable health after recovery from resuscita-
tion.2 °
A recent physician-oriented article suggests that "[a]lthough it is
difficult to cover all potential treatments and scenarios ... [physi-
cians ought to] at least suggest the issues of cardiopulmonary re-
suscitation (CPR) and the use of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion.
, 241
Another issue which patients should understand, given the
likelihood of its materiality, concerns the benefits and risks of ad-
ministering analgesic or painkilling medications. For example, if
the patient wants adequate relief, she should be aware of the risk
of death and, in light of the debate on assisted suicide, of physician
reluctance to administer such relief in the absence of a clear direc-
242tive.
It might be objected that advance directives ought be re-
spected and implemented even in the absence of this disclosure,
and that it is ironic that patient autonomy can be best protected by
ignoring patients'stated uninformed preferences. In fact, there is
no such irony. As Jackson and Younger explained twenty years
ago, "superficial and automatic acquiescence" does not protect pa-
tient autonomy.
243
Informed consent scholars Faden and Beauchamp recognize,
"[p]aternalism is at the core of many discussions of informed con-
240 John E. Heffner et al., Procedure-Specific Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: Effect
on Communication of Treatment Limitations, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 793, 794
(1996) (citations omitted).
241 Carney & Morrisson, supra note 72, at 70 (emphasis added) (noting that pa-
tients should make informed decisions about common potential treatments).
242 See 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 13.9 (discussing the use of general and spe-
cific terms in advance directives). On the other hand, many physicians do prescribe
pain-killing medication that happens to hasten death.
243 David L. Jackson & Stuart Youngner, Patient Autonomy and "Death with
Dignity," 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 404, 408 (1979) (analyzing six cases where superfi-
cial preoccupation with patient autonomy and death with dignity could have led to
inappropriate clinical and ethical decisions).
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sent." 244 "Paternalism is the intentional limitation of the autonomy
of one person by another, where the person who limits autonomy
justifies the action by the goal of helping the person whose auton-
omy is limited., 245 In the advance directive context in particular,
paternalism is represented during the preparation (not the imple-
mentation) of the advance directive by the intentional overriding of
one's expressed preferences for future medical treatment in order
to ensure that preferences recorded in the advance directive are
either authentic or rational. Overriding for the sole purpose of en-
suring that choices are authentic, i.e. informed and voluntary, is
only "soft" paternalism.2 6 Soft paternalism involves only a tempo-
rary restriction of liberty in order to ensure the individual is acting
with adequate knowledge of consequences. It requires that we
temporarily ignore stated preferences in order to ascertain that they
are authentic, because not just any expressed preferences should be
recorded, but only informed and deliberate ones.
Soft paternalism holds that it is proper to intervene in order to
benefit a person only if her contrary choices are substantially not
already autonomous (informed and voluntary). Soft paternalism
holds that intervention is proper specifically only to ensure that
those choices really are autonomous. After all, "[p]eople do not
always mean what they say; they do not always say what they
want; and they do not always want what they say they want.
', 247
Soft paternalistic intervention, therefore, despite the standard no-
menclature, is not really paternalistic at all. Instead, it is anti-
paternalistic, because there is no baseline of autonomy with which
it interferes.
When patients lack sufficient information, the choices they
make are not autonomous.2 8 To hold otherwise is to narrow the
possibility of paternalism by presuming hyperrational patients
244 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 13 (explaining that paternalism and
antipatemalism are generally found in conjunction with moral issues dealing with
when consent should be obtained and when refusal of treatment cannot be honored).
245 Tom L. Beauchamp, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note
53, at 1914.
246 Id. at 1915 (citing Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, I CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 113
(1971)) (describing the differences between strong paternalism and weak paternal-
ism). See also FEINBERG, supra note 171, at 12-16 (detailing the concept of soft pa-
ternalism).
247 Carl Elliott, Meaning What You Say, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 61, 61 (1993)
(looking at patients' statements and past behavior to determine motivation behind
refusal of treatment).
248 See Allen Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 370, 371-72
(1978) (describing the withholding of information as a form of medical paternalism




whose autonomy can be restricted by nothing short of deception,
coercion, or force. If patients' choices are not autonomous, then
interference with those choices (soft paternalism) is not paternal-
istic. There is no usurpation of autonomous decision-making be-
cause there was none to usurp. On the other hand, soft paternalism
is needed to ensure autonomous decision-making.
A recent analysis of the PSDA asks what constitutes its suc-
cessful implementation: "[a]re medical institutions merely to hand
written information to patients and residents, or should they be
certain that consumers fully understand their options and are
making conscious decisions about executing forms? '249 Clearly,
the latter is what must be required. Patients must be "informed"
and not just "Mirandized" of their right to prospective self-
determination. 250 "Even the most appropriate and abundant infor-
mation ... may not sufficiently inform ... [patients] ... if they
are unable to interpret or understand the content of the informa-
tion."25'
B. Understanding the Material Information
Once the formalistic focus of the PSDA is characterized as a
failure of informed consent, it becomes clear that autonomy cannot
be characterized as a negative relation or as non-interference. It is
not enough that physicians leave patients (hand off) to make their
own (uninformed and under-informed) decisions with regard to
advance directives. To do that would push the autonomy model of
medical decision-making too far.25 2 Mere acquiescence to patients'
stated preferences would respect their autonomy only if those
249 Glick et al., supra note 2, at 48 (arguing that the PSDA does not give suffi-
cient guidance to hospitals regarding its implementation, thus, leaving them to create
their own plans, procedures, and objectives).
250 "The idea of informed consent... does not contemplate that informed con-
sent be akin to a medical Miranda warning." See I MEISEL, supra note 24, § 3.7, at
88. See also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972) (discussing the scope of a
physician's duty to inform patients of risk thoroughly, but not excessively).
251 PRESIDENT'S ADvISORY COMMISSION ON COMSUMER PROTECTION AND
QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, QUALITY FIRST: HEALTH CARE FOR ALL
AMERICANS, ch.7 (1998) (entitled Strengthening the Hand of Consumers) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT]. See also Judith H. Hibbard et al., Informing Con-
sumer Decisions in Health Care: Implications from Decision-making Research, 75
MILBANK Q. 395, 396-98 (1997) (explaining that more information is not only not
better, but perhaps worse as far as improving decisions).
252 See Ron Hamel, The Reign of Autonomy: Is the End in Sight?, SECOND
OPINION, Jan. 1995, at 75, 78 (discussing how the role of autonomy in medical deci-
sion-making often allows a patient's uninformed decisions to trump a physician's
professional judgement). See also Schneider, supra note 233 (arguing that patients do
not always act in a completely rational manner).
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stated preferences were well-formed. Unfortunately, as we have
seen, they are not.
Mere disclosure of material information, though necessary, is
insufficient to enable patients to understand. "The intent of the
PSDA is to empower patients to take part in health care decisions
that affect the duration and condition of their lives. ' z 3 Such
empowerment cannot come from an "informative model" of physi-
cian-patient interaction. "[D]iscosure standards .. . . requiring a
specified quantity of information are.., insufficient... [instead],
[t]he key to effective communication [and understanding] is to in-
vite active participation by patients ....,4 What is needed is a
deliberative model of physician-patient interaction for the execu-
tion of advance directives, in which patients and physicians engage
in pedagogical dialogue.
On this model, "individuals [can] critically assess their own
values and preferences; determin[ing] whether they are desirable;
affirm upon reflection, these values as ones that should justify
their actions; and then be free to initiate action to realize the[se]
values." 55 This is what autonomy requires, and it is what the
PSDA should ensure. "What will not do is to presume that a com-
petent person's decision is autonomous."
2 6
[T]he law has not taken a position of entirely uncritical ac-
ceptance of an individual's stated preferences, even in
matters ultimately viewed as private. In assessing a pa-
tient's decision to accept, rather than reject, preferred
medical treatment, for example, courts have insisted that
an autonomous decision worthy of respect by the courts
must be that of an informed individual. Likewise, it would
seem that the decision to refuse treatment should be sub-
ject to the same test of informed consent.25
7
Advance directives cannot have moral authority unless the deci-
sions they embody are preceded by informed consent.
On the other hand, requiring informed consent as a matter of
federal law may be too demanding. The Missouri Supreme Court
observed that "it is definitionally impossible for a person to make
23 Laine & Davidoff, supra note 235, at 154 (discussing the effects of enacting
the PSDA on medical law and patient-centered decision-making).
254 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 307 (explaining why emphasis on
patient-physician communication is better than emphasis on physician disclosure
when obtaining informed consent).
255 Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 236, at 2225.
256 Savulescu, supra note 187, at 210 (emphasis added).
257 Beschle, supra note 165, at 339.
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an informed decision.., under hypothetical circumstances; under
such circumstances, neither the benefits nor the risks of treatment
can be properly weighed or fully appreciated. ''258 Because self-
determination via advance directive lacks "active, contemporane-
ous personal choice," there is a greater likelihood that the "patient
[does] not adequately envision and consider . . . particular situa-
tion[s] within which the actual medical decision[s] must be
made." 59 To require that patients anticipate what preferences they
might have, but be unable to express in a future medical situation,
is so demanding so as to challenge the very idea of making ad-
260vance directives.
Nancy King explains that "[b]ecause prospective health care
decision-making seems to labor under special handicaps of antici-
pation and imagination, it might be thought that making good ad-
vance directives requires a super capacity." 26' King recognizes,
however, that "full understanding" is not necessary. Instead, it is
sufficient that the patient have "substantial understanding," of all
the materially important descriptions of situations.262
Like King, Buchanan and Brock are confident that the insti-
tutional safeguards that are needed to ensure informed consent for
competent patients can be adapted for advance directives. Of
course, since the directive must be drafted "so as to cover an in-
determinate range of contingencies, [the patient] will not be able to
be informed fully. 2 63 Nancy King is right that informed consent
ought not be as strictly required as it is with contemporaneous in-
terventions.264 Yet, although full understanding is too much to
hope for, substantial understanding can still be a legitimate objec-
tive. It is not too much to ask for "thoughtful and circumspect con-
258 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988), (holding that the
guardians of a state hospital patient in a persistent vegetative condition did not have
the authority to order the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration), affd, 497 U.S. 261
(1990).
259 1983 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 62, at 137 (cautioning
against complete reliance on advance directives).
260 See Wolf et al., supra note 9, at 1668 (discussing pre-treatment directives and
their future use).
261 KING, supra note 16, at 74.
262 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 302 (King was a collaborating author
of this book).
263 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 85, at 101.
264 KING, supra note 16, at 78 (advocating against requiring anticipation as a
prerequisite for creating an advance directive since it cannot be assessed fairly). See
Homett, supra note 185, at 309 ("[T]here are good reasons why the courts should be
particularly vigilant to safeguard against ill thought out, misconceived and medically




sideration of relevant medical and non-medical circumstances."
265
As King explains, "[w]e should . . . be demanding of persons
writing directives. We should assume that writers of [advance] di-
rectives have used foresight and carefully considered the imple-
mentations of their choices ... [and] we must endeavor to make
that assumption a reality."
266
"[I]n order to be of genuine use to clinicians in making the
choices patients want, advance directives should demonstrate, [to
the extent psychologically feasible], a higher degree of reflection
and foresight than patients' contemporaneous medical decisions
must display." 267 It is already recommended that people periodi-
cally review, update, and reaffirm their advance directives every
five years or when they experience major life changes. 268 There is
an increased probability that medical preferences will change dra-
matically as life conditions do.269 Moreover, patients should "keep
up with increases in their knowledge of their own conditions and
with advances in medical treatment." 270 This practice highlights
the need to "encourage ... sophistication and foresight in writing
of directives." 271
My fundamental argument is that to the extent better infor-
mation can help individuals identify with their later selves, the
heteronomy which Dresser argues invalidates advance directives,
265 KING, supra note 16, at 105.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 210. See also Hibbard et al., supra note 251, at 401 ("[I]ndividuals often
do not know how they will react to an event, or understand what their needs will be
during that event until they experience it").
26s See generally 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, §§ 10.32, 13.17 (discussing the need
to update advance directives). See also Wolf et al., supra note 9, at 1669 (discussing
periodic physician reexamination of directives with patients); Steven H. Miles et al.,
Advance End of Life Treatment Planning: A Research Review, 156 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1062 (1996) (discussing inherent problems with the current systems
utilized for advanced planning); BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 85, at 104, 153
(discussing the importance of frequently updating advance directives so that they
parallel the individual's wishes in light of new life experiences).
269 Nirtsa Kohut et al., Stability of Treatment Preferences: Although Most Pref-
erences Do Not Change, Most People Change Some of Their Preferences, 8 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 124 (1997) (describing study where 80% of HIV-positive test group
changed at least one of their treatment preferences six months after their original
treatment preferences were expressed).
270 KING, supra note 16, at 81.
271 Id. at 106; see also id. at 73 ("[W]e would like to be able to ensure that medi-
cal care decisions and all decisions are mature, well-reasoned, adequately justified,
sufficiently informed, and sufficiently appreciative of all relevant issues. Yet agree-
ment is lacking about what constitutes sufficient maturity, appreciation, and reason-
ing and how they should be measured").
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can be eliminated. 272 Moreover, even to the extent it cannot be
eliminated, we ought to require very good "reasons to believe that.
. . a directive was not an expression of [a patient's autonomy], [be-
fore deciding that] it is appropriate to disregard such a direc-
tive.''273 The question that must be answered with regard to incom-
petent patients in order to protect their autonomy is what would the
patient want now?274 We need not, as Dresser argues, determine
this hypothetical desire by reference to objective criteria. Instead,
we can determine this hypothetical desire and better respect auton-
omy by ensuring that there is good subjective evidence of prior
expressed preferences.
With sufficient informed consent the living will can still serve
as a valid expression of autonomy. 275 Through sufficient informed
consent the earlier self can learn to think like the later self
would,276 and thus reduce the heteronomy inherent in future-
oriented decision-making. The requisite level of informed consent
should require and, in fact compel, 2 "7 patients to vividly imagine
the circumstances in which they might find themselves, so that the
earlier self is placed in the best position to make decisions for the
272 See May, supra note 164, at 335 ("For advance directives ... additional crite-
ria must be imposed.., in order to ensure that the [advance directive] is a reasonable
predictor of what decision the patient in question would take ... [because the] deci-
sion [is] taken prior to, and independent from, the actual conditions that obtain"). For
the same reasons, some have argued that informed consent is needed so that consum-
ers can better choose health plans. See Hibbard et al., supra note 251, at 400-01, 412.
273 Savulescu, supra note 187, at 211. Admittedly, the empirical evidence re-
viewed in section two of this Article suggests that an advance directive completed
pursuant to the PSDA might not deserve to be presumed an expression of a patient's
autonomy. Nevertheless, this is a contingent circumstance which ought not reverse
the general presumption.
See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 547, 653, 663-64 (NJ. 1976) (discussing Karen
Ann Quinlan's oral informal advance directive).
275 An alternative, compromise solution weighs the authority of the advance di-
rectives proportionate to the degree of psychological connectedness. See BUCHANAN
& BROCK, supra note 85, at 182-83; see also Mark G. Kuczewski, Whose Will Is It,
Anyway ? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in
Medical Ethics, 8 BIOErHiCS 27, 32-46 (1994) (analyzing Buchanan and Brock's
argument).
, 276 See Pearlman, supra note 22, at 356 (establishing three factors to help patient
consider the life-sustaining decisions being made); see also May, supra note 164, at
334-35 ("Advance directives provide a mechanism... to as closely approximate the
autonomous choice the person in question would take").
277 See Savulescu, supra note 187, at 194-95 (arguing that people should be
forced to make complex evaluations about how they would want their lives to go over
time when they consider advance directives).
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later self.278 As Nancy King explains, "an advance directive.
work[s] best when its potential problems are anticipated." 279
Some scholars have argued that "no response can be said to
be a genuinely informed one until the full reality of the choice is
present to the individual."
The more important a decision is to one's life, the less re-
liable abstract speculation about how that decision would
be made in the indefinite future becomes. Despite neoclas-
sical microeconomic theory, important life decisions will
not turn entirely on the calculus of rational considerations.
These decisions will also include assessment of emotions,
desires, fears, and other feelings that cannot possibly be
made, except in the actual presence of those sentiments.
To be "informed" in such circumstances means not merely
to have access to data.., but to be aware of one's own re-
action to the situation in the concrete - information that
cannot be obtained apart from actual confrontation with
the situation.2
This standard is too high. Still, we must require at least sub-
stantial understanding of those completing advance directives. Pa-
tients must be able to substantially understand the nature of the
circumstances to which they might be subject, before making deci-
sions about whether or not to agree to be placed in those circum-
stances. 8 This is the goal, the standard. In the final section, I sug-
gest how this might be achieved.
278 See Childress & Campbell, supra note 167, at 33 (writing that doctors ignored
Dax Cowart's requests to die, because they were of the judgment that the "physical
and emotional shock of the accident and bums had rendered him incompetent to en-
gage in effective deliberation"); see also Confronting Death: Who Chooses, Who
Controls? A Dialogue between Dax Cowart and Robert Burt, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 14, 16 ("[U]ntil we are the ones who are on the sick bed, we cannot
fully appreciate what the other person is going through"); Videotape: Please Let Me
Die (Univ. Tex. Med. Branch, Galveston, 1974) (containing compelling footage of an
interview with Dax Cowart soon after his accident).
279 KING, supra note 16, at 36 (urging patients to take the initiative when talking
with their doctors to identify any problems or questions, thus ensuring the advance
directive is effective).
280 Beschle, supra note 165, at 345 (emphasis added).
281 Id. at341-42.
282 Unfortunately, little has been written about the cognitive capacity needed to
execute an advance directive. See Seena Fazel et al., Ways of Assessing Capacity to
Complete an Advance Directive Should be Developed, 316 BRrr. MED. J. 1321 (1998)
(questioning how doctors should assess the capacity of a patient to complete an ad-
vance directive); see also Mezey et al., supra note 37, at 44 (explaining that some
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Clearly, there are limits to informed consent to interventions
on behalf of a future self. New and unanticipated therapeutic op-
tions might become available, creating options that were not and
could not have been anticipated. Nevertheless, proxies may be able
to extrapolate other expressed preferences. As Alan Meisel ex-
plains, "[a] requirement that an advance directive meet the stan-
dards of information and understanding required of contemporane-
ous informed consent would render advance directives useless. 283
It's just impossible for individuals to appreciate and specify all the
events that might arise. "Human beings are not capable of fore-
seeing either their own medical condition or advances in medical
technology., 28 4 Still, advance directives need not meet some ab-
stract standard of absolute genuineness, but need only be as genu-
ine as humanly possible.
C. The Means to Achieve Adequate Understanding
It is important to vividly imagine the future circumstances in
which one might be.285 Lachlan Forrow provides a Dr. Seuss ex-
ample that colorfully illustrates this point. In Forrow's story a pa-
tient responds to "physician" Sam-I-Am after Sam-I-Am's re-
peated and detailed questioning, "I could not, would not, on a boat.
I will not, will not, with a goat. I will not eat them in the rain. I
will not eat them on a train .... I do not like them anywhere. I do
not like green eggs and ham!'286 In fact, as Forrow observes, the
patient has no idea what green eggs and ham tastes like. After the
evidence indicates that social workers do not speak in-person with nursing home
residents thought to lack decision-making capacity); George J. Agrich, Can The Pa-
tient Make Treatment Decisions? Evaluating Decisional Capacity, 64 CLEv. CLINIC.
J. MED. 461 (1997) (discussing and evaluating treatment decision-making capacity of
patients); D. William Malloy et al., Measuring Capacity to Complete an Advance
Directive, 44 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y 660 (1996) (studying the validity of current
reference standards for the assessment of capacity to complete an advance directive);
Susan Busby-Mott, The Trend Towards Enlightenment Health Care Decision-making
in Lawrence and Doe, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1159, 1179 (1993) (discussing patient deci-
sion-making models and the role of courts in these models).
283 2 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 10.7.
284 In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 614 (N.Y. 1988).
285 See Pearlman, supra note 22, at 355 (listing why educational interventions
have not generally led to an increase in advance-care planning completion, such as
failing to provide the following, "vivid descriptions of common circumstances of
mental incapacity, .... vivid descriptions of life-sustaining treatments," and "vivid
descriptions of possible future health states"). However, can "consent in advance ...
be deemed an informed one... ? Need one marshal authority for the proposition that
many an 'iffy' inclination is disregarded when the actual facts are at hand." Yale
Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing' Legislation,
42 MINN. L. REV. 969. 989 (1958).
286 Forrow, supra note 234, at S30.
[Vol. 9:139
IMPLEMENTATION OF PSDA
patient tries green eggs and ham, she exclaims in colorful extended
verse how much she truly does like them. Similarly, in the advance
directive context patients must get as good a sense as possible of
the medical green eggs and ham so that they can most accurately
predict whether their later selves would like them. 87
The most obvious means by which to prompt more delibera-
tion is through direct patient-physician interaction. Unfortunately,
there has been a demonstrated unwillingness or inability on the
behalf of physicians to do this.288 Of course, this lack of physician
input is not so surprising considering advance directive consults
are not a reimbursable expense under Medicare and Medicaid.2 9
The structure of incentives for today's physician in the managed
care context does not permit lengthy discussion about advance di-
rectives with each patient.29° Still, there are various alternative
means to facilitate patients' vivid imagination. Georgia's informed
consent statute, for example, endorses "the use of video tapes,
audio tapes, pamphlets, booklets, or other means of communica-
tion.' 291 Such approaches have been determined to enable patient
comprehension.
One alternative means of patient education is through the ad-
vance directive form itself and its accompanying literature. There
are many different advance directive forms currently in use in hos-
pitals across the United States with many different levels of de-
tail.2 92 However, "it is unlikely in many settings that a written
27 See Hibbard et al., supra note 251, at 400 (stressing the importance that pa-
tients "anticipate preferences in those changed circumstances" so they can choose an
appropriate health plan for their future).
2: See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing the reasons physicians are
reluctant to discuss end-of-life care with patients). See also supra notes 79-82.
29 See JAMES M. HOEFLER, MANAGING DEATH 160 (1997) (suggesting Medi-
care/Medicaid should reimburse for the costs involved with the creation of advance
directives).
290 See Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28 (discussing how managed care has
deemphasized the bedside role of physicians). See also Mark. A. Rodwin, Managed
Care and Consumer Protection: What Are The Issues? 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1007
(1996) (discussing the potential consumer problems, approaches to consumer protec-
tion, trade-offs in consumer protection policy, and reform proposals in managed
care).
29 GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(c) (1996) (referring to disclosure to persons un-
dergoing certain surgical and diagnostic procedures).92 See, e.g., Peter A. Singer, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO JOINT CENTRE OF
BIOETHICS, LIVING WILL, (last modified Aug. 7, 1998) <http://www.utoronto.catjcb/
jcblw.htm> (discussing different directives and commenting that, "[tlo make an in-
struction for health care decisions, you need to imagine yourself becoming very ill or
nearing death. This is not easy to do. To help you do this, we describe in detail some
health situations in which a living will might be needed, and the life-sustaining treat-
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communication alone, even if well written and augmented with an
opportunity to ask questions, will allow for the effective commu-
nication of information generally required for substantial under-
standing., 293 Rather, patient education "may be successful only if
illustrations [and] examples.. .are supplied., 294 "Visual materials
can also be useful."295
Videotape education has been shown to improve comprehen-
sion of living will and CPR concepts.2 6 This is especially true for
those with advanced age and lower educational levels who even
more urgently need specially designed educational programs297 and
for whom "[w]e need to pursue more effective methods of con-
veying information about life-sustaining treatments." 298 Indeed,
Senator Danforth, the PSDA's proponent in the Senate, testified at
a hearing on the bill that people should be "shown video tapes ten
years before of how they are going to spend the last month of their
lives." 299 Nevertheless, although videotapes do help patients ex-
ments that might be used"); Ben A Rich, Advance Directives: The Next Generation,
19 J. LEG. MED. 63, 87-96 (Mar. 1998) (describing and evaluating the medical direc-
tive developed by Linda E. Emanuel & Ezekiel J.Emanuel, The Medical Directive. A
New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288 (1989)); FADEN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 315-16 (arguing that the physician's behavior, mixed
with the patient's involvement and communication, is valuable in providing the req-
uisite understanding for informed consent).
293 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 26, at 315-16 (explaining that the physi-
cian's role in obtaining informed consent is to teach the patient rather than merely
disclosing medical information).
294 Id. at 315 (describing tools that aid physicians in communicating with pa-
tients).
295 Id. at319.
296 See Elisabeth A. Siegert et al., Impact of Advance Directive Videotape on
Patient Comprehension and Treatment Preferences, 5 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 207, 210
(1996) (examining a pilot study of the effects of videotape on patient comprehension
of advance directive concepts and preferences for resuscitation).
297 See id. at 211.
298 Id. at 212.
299 Hearings, supra note 73, at 4 (statement of Sen. John C. Danforth) (discuss-
ing the need to communicate effectively the importance and consequence of not
having an informed living will).
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plore their values,3 °° they probably fail to have the interactivity
necessary for more careful deliberation.30'
Customized interactive CD-ROM technology may be one an-
swer to advance directive education. The use of this technology
has already been explored in both the classroom302 and the court-
room.30 3 Patient education through CD-ROM may, as a recent
Presidential Commission advised: (1) permit information to be
tailored to individual patients, (2) allow individuals to choose the
level of detail they need, and (3) permit patients to view the infor-
mation in different formats.3 4
CD-ROM accommodates individual's different learning levels
and learning styles. 30 5 "[I]ndividuals rely on mental structures,
called mental models, schemas, or situation models, when they
learn and use information." 3°6 Any attempt to learn begins with
what one already believes. Rather than physicians guessing as to
-0 See generally Videotape: Choices (Southwest Prod. 1994) (focusing on the
value issues that guide decision-making with respect to advance directives); Video-
tape: Dax's Case: Who Should Decide? (Unicorn Media 1985); Videotape: A Time
to Choose (Choice in Dying 1997) (featuring discussions between non-acutely ill
patients, their personal physicians, a lawyer, and an ethicist regarding advance direc-
tive choices); Videotape: An Act of Self Determinhtion (Choice in Dying 1997).
"o1 See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 236, at 2225 (stating that the delibera-
tive model is the ideal physician-patient relationship for appropriate interaction re-
garding advanced health care decision-making).
M See W.Craig Shellhart & Larry J. Oesterle, Assessment of CD-ROM Technol-
ogy in Classroom Teaching, 61 J. DENTAL EDUC. 817 (1997) (discussing the potential
benefits to students using CD-ROM in the classroom); Textbooks on CD-ROM: Mul-
timedia in Education is Better for College Students Than for School Tots, ECONOMIST
Apr. 20, 1996, at 11 (explaining that CD-ROMs are a cost-effective and practical
method of producing educational materials); Maggie Hill & Joan Novelli, Multimedia
in the Classroom, INSTRUCTOR, May-June 1994, at 57 (Supp.) (noting the value of
CD-ROMs for teachers in classroom use).
03 See Martin B. Adams, Malpractice Exhibits Can Persuade, NAT. L.J., June
15, 1998, at B7 (explaining the process of authentication of demonstrative evidence
in malpractice trials); see, e.g., Cindy Collins, Educate the Jury and the Verdict will
Follow ... Difficult and Diverse Cases Drive Robert Ruyak's Civil Litigation Prac-
tice, INSIDE LrrIG., June 1997, at 6 (discussing a lawyer's use of media, such as films
and CD-ROMs, to educate jury members about the case they are hearing).
'04 See generally 1983 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 62, at 231
(discussing the importance of policies regarding resuscitation decisions and their
legal status).
" See generally Pearlman, supra note 22, at 356 (discussing the use of educa-
tional materials in helping a patient identify all relevant factors for making an in-
formed decision); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 20, at 157-60 (ex-
plaining problems of information processing).
V Jon F. Merz & Baruch Fischoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational




what and how to explain to each patient, the patient herself can
proceed in ways that she finds useful. Not only can patients learn
the relevant factors but also how they relate to each other and to
their own medical condition. Patients can go at their own pace,
writing down questions, and they can learn more about any aspect
by "clicking.
307
Patients can get information about risks, side-effects, inter-
ventions, and see in graphic animation the physiology, diagnosis,
and technology. People need analogies to understand possibilities,
for example, risks presented in terms of percentages.3 With inter-
active CD-ROM (and perhaps even virtual reality), they can see
them expressed in pie-charts, bar graphs, in terms of examples, or
in any other way they want the information expressed.3°
The introduction of CD-ROM technology should not supplant
the physician-patient relationship even regarding advance direc-
tives. Yet, this technology clearly has something to offer.310 It can
enable patients to vividly imagine what it will be like to live with
various medical conditions and prognoses, and to make advance
directives that will be more genuine for their future selves.
V. CONCLUSION
Advance directives are legally considered the most reliable
guides to what treatment incompetent patients would want. The
implementation of the PSDA, this country's primary force insti-
gating the completion of these declarations, must assure not only
307 Karen I. Adsit, Multimedia in Nursing and Patient Education, 15 OR-
THOPAEDIC NURSING, July-Aug. 1996 at 59, 60 (discussing how multimedia in the
medical field helps patients and health care providers). See also A Right to Die: The
Dax Cowart Case, Routledge, June, 1997 (allowing the user to participate in the
right-to-die decisions through interactive CD-ROM technology).
3m See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decision-
making: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379
(1990) (explaining that patients do not understand or remember what physicians are
telling them, in large part, because the information is too technical); Daniel J. Mur-
phy et al., The Influence of the Probability of Survival on Patients' Preferences Re-
garding Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 545 (1994) (ex-
plaining patient preferences for receiving CPR after understanding the probability of
survival after the procedure).
.'9 See G. Freeman, CD-ROM Informed Consent May Eliminate Malpractice
Risks, in 2 OBSTETRICAL GYNECOLOGICAL MALPRACTICE PREVENTION 1 (1995); see
also Arlene Klepatsky & Laura Mahlmeister, Consent and Informed Consent in Peri-
natal and Neonatal Settings, 11 J. PERINATAL & NEONATAL NURSING, June 1997, at
34, 43 & n.18 (emphasizing the importance of obtaining informed consent for inva-
sive medical procedures).
310 Thomas May is right that there is a significant lack of empirical research con-
ceming how advance directives can be designed to reflect patient preferences. May,
supra note 164, at 336-37.
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that advance directives are preceded by informed consent will ad-
vance directives deserve to be respected as an expression written,
but also that they are written with sufficient understanding. This
will require a "more sophisticated consultation" and will be more
costly. But only when of what incompetent patients would have
wanted. Only with informed consent can we overcome the hetero-
nomy that undermines the moral authority of future oriented medi-
cal decision-making.
Legislation introduced in November 1997, the Advance Plan-
ning and Compassionate Care Act of 1997,312 "aims to expand and
clarify the requirements regulating advance directives." The bill
"builds on the Patient Self Determination Act," "improves the type
and amount of information available to consumers," and "seeks to
ensure that the medical care of patients at the end of their lives
reflects their [own] desire[s] [for autonomy].313 One provision
requires hospitals "to provide each individual with the opportunity
to discuss issues relating to the information provided to that indi-.
vidual pursuant to [the PSDA].- 314
If these or similar amendments are enacted,315 the PSDA will
be beneficially strengthened.316 Senator Jay Rockefeller, who in-
troduced the bill with Senator Susan Collins, explained that the
"law will direct that patients be counseled with and that they have
a very clear idea of what choices are available to them. It injects
the personal element much, much more than right now, which is
kind of a paper element and it's not working.3 17 This legislation is
sorely needed so that individuals can meaningfully exercise con-
311 Kenneth R. Thomas, The Right to Die: Where Do We Go From Here? FED.
LAW., Oct. 1997, at 22, 29 (discussing the disadvantage of advance directives, in-
cluding administrative burdens and increased costs).
312 S. 1345, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rockefeller & Collins); H.R.
2999, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Levin).
313 143 CONG. REc. E2318-19 (1997) (statement of Rep. Sander M. Levin).
314 S. 1345 § II(a) (clarifying the requirements regarding advance directives in
order to "ensure that an individual's health care decisions are complied with").
315 Rockefeller's bill died with the 10 5 th Congress. Similar legislation, how-
ever, has already been introduced in the 10 6 1h Congress. See, e.g., S. 24, 1 0 6 th
Cong. § 501 (a2B) (1999) (sponsored by Specter) (directing HHS to develop a
"national advance directive form").
316 The operation of the PSDA in some states already requires this because of
state law. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65(2) (West 1996) (-A health care in-
stitution shall ... assist patients interested in discussing and executing an advance
directive").




trol over their post-autonomous medical care. 318 Right now, "in-
formed consent is well entrenched in theory, but in practice patient
autonomy continues to be elusive., 319 Improving patients' under-
standing of both legal and medical information regarding their ad-
vance directives will help preserve their autonomy and self-
determination.
318 It is important to note that improving the reliability of advance directives will
only help the small percentage of people who use them. Other will need other vehi-
cles to preserve their autonomy interests. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 8, at 292.
319 George J. Annas & Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture
and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.
L. & MED. 357, 369 (1994) (comparing informed consent laws of the United States
with those of the United Kingdom and Japan and exploring the impact of culture on
medical practices).
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